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MINNESOTA
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VOLUmE 23 MAY, 1939 No. 6
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
By OSMOND K. FRAENKEL*
A s soon as the American colonies threw off the English yoke,
they began formalizing their experience into written consti-
tutions.' Many of these contained "bills of rights, ' 2 provisions
restricting governmental power for the protection of individual
liberty. The failure of the drafters of the constitution of 1787
to include similar provisions nearly blocked ratification, 3 and, as
is well known, the first eight amendments were adopted to meet
this deficiency.
These amendments affected only federal power.' Presumably
the early advocates of civil liberties believed that the provisions
of the state constitutions would be adequate to protect individual
liberty against state interference. And they seem to have been
correct over a long period. It is curious, nevertheless, that no
suggestion originally was made to have the proposed bill of rights
restrict state as well as national power. For in the drafting of
the constitution itself it had been recognized that action by the
states might result in curtailment of liberties.
The original constitution thus provided against state action
with regard to ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, for the
provisions concerning these, though placed in separate sections,'
are binding on both state and federal governments in identical
*Associated with the firm of Goldsmith, Jackson & Brock, New York
City.c All the original colonies, except Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted
constitutions before 1789. See Dealey, Growth of American State Consti-
tutions (1915).
-Massachusetts (1780); Pennsylvania (1776); Virginia (1776).
3See 1 Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions (1866) 323-337;
1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 533-6; 3 Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution (1st ed. 1833) 713-720.
4 See notes 26-28, infra.
'United States, Constitution, art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3; sec. 10, cl. 1 (cf. also
prohibition against titles of nobility, sec. 9, cl. 8, sec. 10, cl. 1). See notes
34. 35, infra.
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language. However, the other civil liberties provisions of the Con-
stitution, those dealing with habeas corpus" and trial by jury,'
affect only federal power. There is no explanation extant of this
divergent treatment of various liberties.
The rights specified in these provisions of the Constitution, and
the early amendments alike, continue, with a few minor excep-
tions, to have vitality. They derive from essential needs of the
human spirit in its effort to develop. We need not at this point
concern ourselves with the extent to which they are relative to
each other, or to some conception of the necessities of public
order. But it is mischievous to give any of the rights of in-
dividuals an a priori precedence over any other. The recent state-
ment of Vice Chancellor Berry of New Jersey, tor example, that
the right of free speech must yield to rights of property because
the latter are basic and the former only granted,8 runs counter to
the spirit of our institutions. That property rights transcend per-
sonal rights may too frequently have been the view of judges
graduated into their calling from careers of advocacy for powerful
business interests. This has not been the view of our great legal
thinkers. And many foreign commentators on the institution of
judicial review have praised it to the extent that personal rights
have received protection thereby. 9 That is a fundamentally sound
position. For, while property rights remain essential to the exist-
ing order of capitalist society, personal rights inhere in any
free government.
Moreover, it is with personal rights that the guaranties chiefly
dealt. Except in so far as the condemnation of bills of attainder
might be such, property received its sole protection against federal
action in the requirements of due process and of compensation
for public taking contained in the fifth amendment; against state
action it was protected by the contract clause of the original con-
stitution only. No change in this respect occurred until after the
Civil War. Then, for the purpose of protecting the Negro in his
newly won freedom, there came the first federal interference with
state power over business. Primarily, it resulted from the due
6United States, Constitution, art. I, sec. 9, cl. 2. See notes 31-43, infra.
7United States, Constitution, art. III, sec. 2, cl. 3. See notes 110-114,
infra.
sMitnick v. Furniture Workers, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200 Atl.
553; see (1938) 48 Yale L J. 67.
9See Haines, Some Phases of the Theory and Practice of Judicial
Review of Legislation in Foreign Countries, (1930) 24 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
583, 598, 605.
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process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The latter clause is remarkable in that it imposes on the states a re-
striction nowhere imposed upon the federal government. 10 Yet,
wlile it has been used extensively to protect property against taxa-
tion and regulation," as we shall see, it has not had so profound
an influence on civil liberties as might have been supposed.
Property received its greatest protection from the extended
meaning which the courts began to give the due process clause in
the last decade of the nineteenth century.12 But in recent times it
has also come to have great importance in the field of civil liberties.
Not only, in accordance with its original, procedural, meaning, has
it ensured fair trials, 3 but it has also become a bulwark against
state interference with fundamental rights such as freedom of
speech and of the press, of religion and of assembly.' 4 Yet there
are other rights guaranteed against federal curtailment which have
not been thus siphoned into the fourteenth amendment. For pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures'5 and against
self-incrimination,'0 for assurance of prosecution only after in-
dictment,'7 even for the safeguard of jury trial in criminal cases,'
'
0 See LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, (1921) 256 U. S. 377,
392, 41 Sup. Ct. 528, 65 L. Ed. 998. But in a number of recent cases the
Supreme Court has considered-and rejected-arguments of counsel that
a classification under an Act of Congress was so arbitrary as to be a
denial of due process. See Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, (1937)
300 U. S. 139, 57 Sup. Ct. 407, 81 L. Ed. 562; Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed. 1279; Helvering
v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904, 81 L. Ed. 1307.
"iFor a discussion of recent cases under the equal protection clause
see Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1934 Term,(1936) 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 345, id. 1935 Term, (1936) 85 U. Pa. L. Rev.
27; id. 1936 Term, (1937) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 38; id. 1937 Term (1938)
87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 50.1
-For a discussion of recent cases under the due process clause see
Fraenkel, note 11 supra.13See notes 138-149 infra.
14The subject has been considered at length by Wilkinson, The
Federal Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment, (1938) 26 Geo. L. J. 439,
and in Note (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 490. See notes 15-19, 173-221
infra.
15Adams v. New York, (1904) 192 U. S. 585, 594, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48
L. Ed. 575. Cf. refusal to review People v. Defore, (1926) 242 N. Y. 13,
150 N. E. 585, in (1926) 270 U. S. 657, 46 Sup. Ct. 354, 70 L. Ed. 784. But
see contra Hague v. C. I. 0. (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 774 on the
ground that this was both a violation of the due process clause and the
privileges and immunities clause. (Now awaiting decision from the United
States Supreme Court.)
16Twining v. New Jersey, (1908) 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53
L. Ed. 97.17Hurtado v. California, (1884) 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup., Ct. 111, 292, 28
L. Ed. 232.
SsWalker v. Sauvinet, (1876) 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. Ed. 678; .Jordan v.
Massachusetts, (1912) 225 U. S. 167, 32 Sup. Ct. 651, 56 L. Ed. 1038.
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recourse must still be had to state constitutions and state courts.
In such situations as these the federal court will not interfere. An
explanation of these differences may not be readily apparent. Mr.
Justice Cardozo recently attempted a formulation of the guiding
principle:
"The line of division may seem to be-wavering and broken if
there is a hasty catalogue of the cases on the one side and the
other. Reflection and analysis will induce a different view. There
emerges the perception of a rationalizing principle which gives
to discrete instances a proper order and coherence. The right to
trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the
result of an indictment may have value and importance. Even so,
they are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.
To abolish them is not to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' Few would be so narrow or provincial as to main-
tain that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be im-
possible without them. What is true of jury trials and indictments
is true also, as the cases show, of the immunity from compulsory
self-incrimination. This too might be lost, and justice still be
done. Indeed, today as in the past there are students of our penal
system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a
benefit, and who would limit its scope or destroy it altogether. No
doubt there would remain the need to give protection against
torture, physical or mental. Justice, however, would not perish
if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly in-
quiry. The exclusion of these immunities and privileges from
the privileges and immunities protected against the action of the
states has not been arbitrary or casual. It has been dictated by a
study and appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications
of liberty itself.""
These Civil War amendments created additional rights. For
the first time, by the fifteenth amendment, the federal govern-
ment was permitted to review state restrictions on the franchise;
to be sure, in case of discrimination due to race, color or previous
servitude only. And the first clause of the fourteenth added a
guaranty of "privileges and immunities," which has been of little
value to the negro for whom it was supposedly enacted. Finally,
in the thirteenth amendment, involuntary servitude was for-
bidden. This provision is unique in that it binds at once the
federal government, the states and individuals.
For the protection afforded by these amendments. other than
the thirteenth, is against state action, not action by individuals.
39Palko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149,
82 L. Ed. 288. See also note 14 supra.
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Nor have the courts always protected persons even against state
action. Judges who stretched the consti'ution in order to protect
property rights were frequently content to stick to the literal
meaning of the amendments when personal rights were involved.
20
And it is only in the last few years, when the dreaded example
of Fascism may be serving as a warning, that a truly liberal
approach to the subject of civil liberties has become the rule
rather than the exception.
I. BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
In the early period of our history the courts were little con-
cerned with federal encroachments on liberty. Except for the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Congress had attempted no
restrictions on individual freedom. While opinion differed con-
cerning the constitutionality of these hated laws, 21 no authoritative
decision was ever rendered on the subject.
During the half century or so following the adoption of the
constitution, however, an increasing concern with state encroach-
ment appears. At first this showed itself in the field of property
rights. When restrospective laws were attacked as a violation
of the prohibition against "ex post facto" legislation, Mr. Justice
Story pointed out that this guaranty related only to criminal
prosecutions, and that nothing in the federal constitution then
prohibited a state from divesting vested property interests.2 2 On
the other hand, not only was the contract clause used wheneer
possible; often, in the using, it was stretched unbelievably to
accomplish the same end.23  And in matters of taxation the
Supreme Court interfered with state action on grounds of "natural
2iBorchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights, (1938) 47 Yale
L. J. 1051; Boudin, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights, (1937) 1 Sci. &
Soc. 273; Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control over Congress, (1937)
22 Corn. L. J. 299; Fraenkel, What Can be Done About the Constitution
and the Supreme Court?, (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 212; Jacobson, Federalism
and Property Rights, (1938) 15 N. Y. Univ. L. Q. Rev. 319; Curbing the
Courts, (1937) Int. Jurid. Ass'n pamphlet.
2 Jefferson, of course, believed the laws to be unconstitutional. Cooley
was of the same opinion. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1st ed. 1868)
421. Story, however, while believing them unwise, had no doubt about
their constitutionality: 3 Story, Commentaries (1st ed. 1833) 743-5. See
Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time (1920) 30.
22Watson v. Mercer, (1834) 8 Pet. (U.S.) 88, 110, 8 L. Ed. 876. The
general principle had been laid down in Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 Dal].
(U.S.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648.
23For a discussion of recent cases see Fraenkel, Note 11 supra, at
353. 63, 70 and 79 respectively.
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law."24  In the main, however, federal judicial protection of
property and business interests against state action occurred only
with the adoption, in the last decade of the nineteenth century,
of the expanded meaning of the due process clause.2 5
It was in the course of early, but abortive, efforts on the part
of property to obtain protection from federal courts against state
action, that the Supreme Couri reached the conclusion that the
Bill of Rights constituted no protection of this sort. The con-
clusion, sometimes criticized, is natural enough in view of the
language of the early amendments. The issue arose first in
Brown v. Mayor, etc. of Baltimore,2 under that clause of the
fifth amendment which prohibits the taking of private property
for public use without the payment of just compensation. Chief
Justice Marshall said:
"Had the people of the several states, or any of them, re-
quired changes in their constitutions; had they required addi-
tional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments
of their particular governments, the remedy was in their own
hands, and would have been applied by themselves. A conven-
tion would have been assembled by the discontented State, and
the required improvements would have been made by itself. The
unwieldy and cumbrous machinery of procuring a recommendation
from two-thirds of Congress and the assent of three-fourths of
their sister states, could never have occurred to any human being
as 9, mode of doing that which might be effected by the state itself.
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be
limitations on the powers of the state governments they would
have imitated the framers of the original constitution and have
expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the extra-
ordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the several
states by affording the people additional protection from the exer-
cise of power by their own, governments in matters which con-
cerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose
in plain and intelligible language.
But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of
the day, that the great revolution which established the constitu-
tion of the United States was not effected without immense
opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those
powers which the patriot statesmen who then watched over the
interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the
attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was
sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In
almost every convention by which the Constitution was adopted,
24See Fraenkel, the Supreme Court and the Taxing Power of the
States, (1934) 28 Ill. L. Rev. 612.25See notes 160-165 infra.28(1833) 7 Pet. (U.S.) 243, 8 L. Ed. 672.
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amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recom-
mended. These amendments demanded security against the appre-
hended encroachments of the general government-not against
those of the local governments.1 27
When shortly after this opinion, therefore, complaints arose
of state interference with various personal rights guaranteed in
the first eight amendments, the door had been closed to their con-
sideration by the federal judiciary.28 The burden of these com-
plaints has, however, been a recurrent one. Right down to the
present, defeat seems not to have deterred counsel for those
accused of crime. First, and unsuccessfully, they urged that
these rights were protected by the privileges and immunities
clause .2  Later, and, as we have noted, with partial success, the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became the
instrument for the protection of those rights which were so
fundamental that their absence was inconsistent with any system
of "ordered justice."30
II. CIVIL WAR PROBLEMS-MARTIAL LAW AND HABEAS CORPUS
The Civil War created problems of civil liberties out of which
arose the first legal landmarks in the subject. Curiously, they
rested on provisions of the original constitution, not on any of
the amendments. They related to habeas corpus, ex post facto
laws and bills of attainder.
While the war was going on the Supreme Court neglected an
opportunity of condemning the acts of President Lincoln and the
military authorities in ignoring writs of habeas corpus.31 But
after the war was safely won, the Court, by a five-to-four deci-
sion, in Ex parte Muilligan3 2 condemned trials by military com-
27(1833) 7 Pet. (U.S.) 243, 249, 8 L. Ed. 672.
:'Livingston v. Moore, (1833) 7 Pet. (U.S.) 469, 551, 8 L. Ed. 751,
(the right to trial by jury in civil cases) ; Permoli v. New Orleans, (1845)
3 How. (U.S.) 589, 609, 11 L. Ed. 739 (religious liberty); Fox v. Ohio,
(1847) 5 How. (U.S.) 410, 434, 12 L. Ed. 213 (freedom from doublejeopardy); Smith v. Maryland, (1855) 18 How. (U.S.) 71, 15 L. Ed.
269 (searches and seizures). For cases decided after the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment see notes 15-19 supra.
20As in Presser v. Illinois, (1886) 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580, 29 L.
Ed. 615.
BOPalko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149,
82 L. Ed. 288.
3See Klaus, The Milligan Case (1929) 4 ff. Judge Taney condemned
the executive in an opinion written while on circuit, Ex parte Merryman.
(C.C. Md. 1861) Fed. Cas. 9487, but the Court refused to act in another
instance, on technical grounds, Ex parte Vallandigham, (1864) 1 Wall.
(U.S.) 243, 17 L. Ed. 589.
-32(1866) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281.
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manders outside the areas of actual warfare. The words of Mr.
Justice Davis on this subject have been oftener quoted than
heeded. He said:
"Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times
would arise, when rulers and people would become restive under
restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish
ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitu-
tional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable
law. The history of the world has taught them that what was
done in the past might be attempted in the future. The Constitu-
tion of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever in-
vented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be sus-
pended during any of the great exigencies of government.
'33
At the same time, the Court set itself against attempts of
both national and state governments to disqualify lawyers, preach-
ers and doctors from continuing to practice their professions un-
less they were willing to take an oath that they had not partici-
pated in the rebellion. In two five-to-four decisions 34 the Court
held these laws unconstitutional as both bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws. The decisions, however, had no influence on
the future; for bills of attainder had lost significance and the
prohibition against ex post facto laws has really nothing to do
with legislation of this kind.3"
Even the decision in the Milligan Case has been less fruitful
than might have been expected. Almost immediately, the Supreme
Court meekly permitted itself to be temporarily deprived of ap-
pellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases, when Congress wanted
to prevent review of its reconstruction legislation.36
While the constitutional prohibition against suspension of the
right of habeas corpus is, of course, not directed against state
action,37 the writ may be available in a federal court to challenge
33(1866) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2, 120, 17 L. Ed. 589.
34Cummings v. Missouri, (1867) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 356;
Ex parte Garland, (1867) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366.
35See Dent v. West Virginia, (1889) 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231,
32 L. Ed. 623; Hawker v. New York, (1898) 170 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct.
583, 42 L. Ed. 1002, (laws changing the qualifications of the practice of
professions are not ex post facto laws).3 6Ex parte McCardle, (1869) 6 Wall. (U.S.) 318, 18 L. Ed. 816;
(1869) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 506, 19 L. Ed. 264. See 3 Warren, History of
the United States Supreme Court (1922) 185-202.37Gasquet v. Lapeyre, (1917) 242 U. S. 367, 37 Sup. Ct. 165, 61 L. Ed.
367.
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state action, executive and judicial, in extreme cases, when a con-
stitutional issue is raised and no other remedy is available. 38
Due to the growing use of troops and martial law in labor
controversies," the extent to which federal courts will interfere
with detentions under martial law has become of great importance.
The early cases seemed to imply that the decision of a governor
that it was necessary to declare martial law could not be reviewed
by the courts."' However, in the recent case of Sterling v. Con-
stantin,41 Chief Justice Hughes reached a different conclusion.
He held that the action of the governor of Texas was not neces-
sary to preserve order and issued an injunction to restrain the
regulation of oil production under compulsion of troops. This
decision declares it the duty of the federal courts to determine
whether any basis exists in the facts for a challenged declara-
tion of martial law. Habeas corpus should, therefore, be available
to challenge detention of labor organizers in situations such as
these. A lower federal court had already so ruled, even before
the decision in the Sterling Case." Unfortunately, the courts
sheer off from questioning executive action when it is taken to
prevent a labor situation getting out of hand.43
"3See Mooney v. Holohan, (1935) 294 U. S. 103, 55 Sup. Ct. 340, 79
L. Ed. 791. But in Pettibone v. Nichols, (1906) 203 U. S. 192, 27 Sup.
Ct. 111, 51 L. Ed. 148, the Court, over the sole dissent of Mr. Justice
McKenna, refused to review by habeas corpus a detention on a charge of
murder, although the accused claimed that they had been extradited under
circumstances that denied them any opportunity to test the lawfulness of
the proceedings.
For recent instances in which writs of habeas corpus have been
granted to review state convictions see Jones v. Kentucky, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1938) 97 F. (2d) 335; Howard v. Dodd, (D. Ind. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 844.
Compare Shields v. Shields, (D. Mo. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 210-this was in
review of an order in a lunacy proceeding. But see contra: McLeod v.
Majors, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 129, and United States v.
Ragen, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 184, on the ground that all
remedies had not been exhausted under the state law.
.,Comment, Use of Military Force in Domestic Disturbances (1936)
45 Yale L. J. 879; Call Out the Militia (1938), Am. Civil Liberties
Union pamphlet. A recent instance was at Newton, Iowa. The governor
used troops to close the plant of the Maytag Washing Machine Co. during
a strike and in effect ordered a settlement and reopening by armed
forces. He even threatened to use troops to stop a hearing of the
National Labor Relations Board. See N. Y. Times (1938) Aug. 1 at 1:3;
3 at 1:4,4 at 1:3. 5 at 1:2, 13 at 2:4.
V'See Luther v. Borden, (1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 anl
Miyer v. Peabrdy. (1908) 212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235, 53 L. Ed. 410.
Bloth these cases. however, were actions to recover damages for detention.
. 4(1932) 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190, 77 L. Ed. 375, and see Strut-
wear Knitting Co. v. Olson, (D. Minn. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 384.
42United States v. Adams, (D. Colo. 1927) 26 F. (2d) 141.
'-'See particularly the Moyer Case, (1908) 212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235,
53 L. Fd. 410.
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III. IN AID OF THE UNPOPULAR AND UNDERPRIVILEGED
Just as we have discussed provisions of the original constitu-
tion which affect civil liberties, so it becomes pertinent to con-
sider also the post-Civil War amendments. These greatly in-
creased the field in which state action came under federal scrutiny.
They were all, although not simultaneously so,4 4 adopted to pro-
tect the negro,45 and, of course, to benefit other minority groups
or individuals as well. We shall at this point discuss the thirteenth
and fifteenth amendments and those portions of the fourteenth de-
signed to prevent discrimination, leaving for later consideration
under various heads the due process clause of the latter.40  Con-
gress endeavored to implement these provisions by punitive laws.
But most of the attempts, as we shall see, were held unconstitu-
tional.
47
PEONAGE
The thirteenth amendment achieved its ostensible purpose of
preventing slavery; and it continues to have vitality when con-
fronted by modem devices for circumventing that purpose. To-
day in many states, individuals fined for petty offenses agree to
work for a fixed time for the person who pays the fine; and
failure to live up to such a contract is made a criminal offense.48
Under these conditions it is easy to procure labor forced to work
under fear of punishment, since local courts tend not to be over
scrupulous in some situations. For many years such practices
have flourished in the deep South, even though the Supreme Court
of the United States has declared contracts of this nature to be in
violation of the amendment and has upheld the right of Congress
to punish persons who take part in their enforcement.49  The
Supreme Court has also struck down state laws which punish as a
fraud the failure to work for the time agreed on in return for an
advance payment, when the law permits the jury to find a pre-
sumption of fraud from the mere refusal to work. 0 The battle
44Amd. XIII proposed Jan. 31, 1865, ratified Dec. 9, 1865. Amd. XIV
proposed June 13, 1866, ratified July 9, 1868. Amd. XV proposed Feb. 26,
1869, ratified Feb. 3, 1870.45See Slaughterhouse Cases, (1893) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 465.
46See infra, notes ]39-152, 154-168.
47The Enforcement Act of 1870; the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See 2
Boudin, Government by judiciary (1932) 126 ff. and notes 69, 75 infra.
4SSee (1937) 5 I.J.A. Bulletin 71.49United States v. Reynolds, (1914) 235 U. S. 133, 35 Sup. Ct. 86,
59 L. Ed. 162.
5OBailey v. Alabama, (1919) 219 U. S. 219, 31 Sup. Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed.
191.
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against peonage, however, is one which must be fought constantly,
over and over again. Recent convictions in Arkansas point the
fact strongly. 1
Peonage, as a matter of fact, is in effect accomplished by
making it difficult for workers to change their employment. Many
states forbid "enticement" of workers,12 thus preventing offers to
them of better conditions. None of these laws has yet been tested.
Sometimes force is used to prevent workers from responding
to the lure of improved wages. This happened recently in
Georgia; cotton pickers were scarce and the market price was
falling in the face of a large crop, so that it became important
to get the cotton picked quickly. 3 Presumably conduct such as
this is punishable under existing federal statutes.
Not all forced labor, however, is forbidden. For traditional
reasons seamen, for example, have been subject to punishment
for breaking their articles. 4 Fortunately, Congress has recently
removed this particular anachronism from the law.53 A state, too,
may exact necessary labor, such as road building, from its citi-
zens and may punish them, if they fail to perform it."
SUFFRAGE
Freeing the negro soon came to be recognized as insufficient.
Obviously, it was advisable to protect him also against discrimina-
tion in his most important civic right, the vote. But, while the
fifteenth amendment accomplished this on paper, in actual prac-
tice the negro has remained widely disfranchised. 57  At first dis-
franchisement was accomplished by severe property and educa-
tional qualifications from which all persons were exempted whose
grandfathers had voted before 1868. After a long period, the
Supreme Court finally held these so-called "grandfather clauses"
void, as intentional evasions of the thirteenth amendment.58
51See N. Y. Times (1936) Nov. 23, 42:3; Nov. 25, 46:2; Nov. 26, 1:5;
Dec. 11, 3:1.
5-See note 48 supra.
MSee N. Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1937 at 1:6.
54Robertson v. Baldwin, (1897) 165 U. S. 275, 17 Sup. Ct. 326, 41
L. Ed. 715.
5
5R. S. Sec. 4598, 4599 were repealed by Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28
sec. 25, 30 Stat. at L. 764.
5
'6Butler v. Perry, (1916) 240 U. S. 328, 36 Sup. Ct. 258, 60 L. Ed. 672.
USee Fraenkel, Restrictions on Voting in the United States, (1938)
1 Nat. L. G. Q. 135.
5
"Guinn v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 347, 35 Sup. Ct. 926, 59
L. Ed. 1340; Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U. S. 368, 35 Sup. Ct. 932,
59 L. Ed. 1349. But see Lane v. Wilson, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d)
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Certain laws imposing educational" or property 0 qualifications
have been upheld, however, though their purpose and effect is to
restrict the number of negro voters, since they operate in theoretical
equality on white and black alike. The commonest device adopted
to this end is the poll tax. While usually very small in amount, this
is frequently cumulative, so that the poor have great difficulty in
paying it. The validity of the method was upheld last year by a
unanimous Supreme Court in Breedlove v. Suttles.61
Still another method of disfranchisement, used especially in the
South, is that of preventing negroes from voting in the primaries of
the Democratic party. In most Southern communities the election
is, of course, decided in that primary. Yet, as the fifteenth amend-
ment, unlike the thirteenth, contains no restrictions on individual
action, in Grovey v. Townsend 2 the Supreme Court recently re-
fused to interfere with this practice, on the ground that since
political parties are purely private organizations the state had in
no way caused the discrimination.
It should be remembered that this amendment prohibits dis-
crimination based on race, color or previous condition of servitude
only. (The nineteenth amendment, of course, has added sex to
these categories). It therefore remains uncertain whether the
constitution forbids discrimination in voting which is based on
political or religious opinion. It is possible that the courts might
rule such discrimination void as being a denial of equal protection
or due process. Yet the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
restrictions on voting which disqualified any one cohabiting with
more than one wife,, on the broad ground that the legislature might
"prescribe any qualifications for voters calculated to secure
obedience to its laws." 63
980, certiorari granted Dec. 12, 1938 upholding Oklahoma law, passed just
after these decisions, which restricted the franchise to those who had
voted in 1914 or registered between May 10 and June 30, 1916.
59See Trudeau v. Barnes, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933) 65 F. 2d 563 cert.
denied (1933) 290 U. S. 659, 54 Sup. Ct. 74, 78 L Ed. 571-but in that
case remedies afforded by the state law had not been exhausted.
6oSee United States v. Reese, (1876) 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563-
concurring opinion of Clifford, J.61(1938) 302 U. S. 277, 58 Sup. Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252.
62(1935) 295 U. S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622, 79 L. Ed. 1292. Earlier deci-
sions to different effect were distinguished because in those cases the state
had participated in the discrimination: Nixon v. Herndon, (1927) 273
U. S. 536, 47 Sup. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759; Nixon v. Condon, (1932) 286
U. S. 73, 52 Sup. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984.
63Davis v. Beason, (1890) 133 U. S. 333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637.
Cf. Murphy v. Ramsay, (1885) 114 U. S. 15, 5 Sup. Ct. 747, 29 L. Ed.
47; Pope v. Williams, (1904) 193 U. S. 621,24 Sup. Ct. 573, 48 L. Ed. 817.
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But even if the individual may not be deprived of his vote on
account of his opinions, the effectiveness of that vote may be des-
troyed by its being made difficult or impossible for minority parties
to place their candidates on the ballot.6 4 Whether state legislation
of this character can be reviewed in the federal courts is doubt-
ful. 65
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
The first clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits state
legislation abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States." This is an extension of the provision of the
original constitution, which guaranteed to a citizen of each state
all the privileges and immunities of citizenship in the other states.66
Since the original provision had been interpreted as not protecting
a person against action by the state of his residence,6 the new pro-
vision presumably was intended to accomplish at least so much;
and the Supreme Court has now reached that conclusion.1
8
However, the amendment has not served its basic purpose of
protecting the negro in the exercise of fundamental rights. For,
almost immediately after the adoption of the amendment, the Court
ruled that the rights to vote, to assemble and to be safe from as-
sault were rights of state citizenship, not of national citizenship,
and therefore beyond the power of Congress to protect.69 These
decisions have been constantly adhered to.
70
04AII states have laws which impose some restriction; a few states bar
parties charged with the advocacy of the overthrow of the government by
force. See (1936) 5 I.J.A. Bull. 57, 58.
135n Blackman v. Stone, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 500
an attempt to recover damages for denying the Communist Party a place
on the ballot in the 1936 election was upheld. The Court overruled numerous
attacks on the Illinois Election Law and on the proceedings of the electoral
board. Previous attempts to obtain relief by injunction failed because the
question had become moot. Blackman v. Stone. (1937) 300 U. S. 641, 57
Sup. Ct. 512, 81 L. Ed. 856, cf. Johnson v. Hughes, (1936) 299 U. S.
601, 57 Sup. Ct. 193, 81 L. Ed. 443. See Note (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 86.6AUnited States Constitution art. IV sec. 2.
C7Bradwell v. Illinois, (1873) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 130, 21 L. Ed. 442.
OSColgate v. Harvey, (1935) 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed.
299.
r9United States v. Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588. See
also United States v. Harris, (1883) 106 U. S. 629. 1 Sup. Ct. 601, 27
L. Ed. 290. The foundation for these cases had been laid in the Slaughter-
house Cases, (1873) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394. In United States
v. Reese, (1875) 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563. the Court, by a strained
construction of the indictment, concluded that an attempt was made to
punish for interference with all voting, not only voting for federal officers.
See also James v. Bowman, (1903) 190 U. S. 127, 23 Sup. Ct. 678, 47
L. Ed. 979.
7OSee Hamilton v. Regents, (1934) 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197, 79
L. Ed. 343. But in Colgate v. Harvey, (1935) 296 U. S. 404. 56 Sup. Ct.
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The Court has nevertheless upheld legislation punishing inter-
ference with voting, when that was restricted to voting for federal
offices. 71
Although it has been said that the right to travel freely from
one state to another is protected by this clause of the fourteenth
amendment,7 2 the Supreme Court, in the Wheeler Case,73 further
restricted its effectiveness by ruling that Congress could not punish
persons who forcibly transported a citizen out of his home state
and threatened him with injury if he returned. This ruling rested
in part on the fact that the right to remain at peace in one's own
home is not a right created by national citizenship; in part on the
fact that it was private action, not state action, which was re-
sponsible for the wrong. It remains undecided whether Congress
could punish if the person threatened were a visitor to the state,
although an attempt was made to obtain a ruling on this subject by
the now abortive prosecution in Harlan County, Kentucky. This
rested on the theory that the right of collective bargaining granted
by the National Labor Relations Act had been interfered with.
The serious question in the case was the right to prosecute private
persons. Similar considerations, of course, affect the validity of
the anti-lynching legislation so often blocked by filibusters.
No such complication, however, existed in the recent action by
the American Civil Liberties Union and the C. I. 0. against Mayor
Hague. There one of the issues was the right of the Jersey City
police to escort persons out of the state.
252, 80 L. Ed. 299, the majority of the Court held that the right to invest
money in a state other than that of one's residence was an attribute of
national citizenship, protected by the fourteenth amendment against in-
fringement by the state of residence-Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo
dissented.
But it has been argued that recent rulings under the due process
clause (see note 14 supra) have included freedom of speech and other
basic rights among the privileges and immunities of national citizenship.
See Deutsch, Federal Equity Jurisdiction of Cases Involving Freedom of
Press, (1939) 25 Va. L. Rev. 507. Mr. Deutsch has stressed Mr. Justice
Cardozo's references in the Palko case, (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149,
82 L. Ed. 288, to these rights as "privileges and immunities." It is doubtful,
however, whether the Supreme Court will reverse its consistent attitude
which is nearly 100 years old.
71Ex parte Siebold, (1879) 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717; Ex parte
Yarborough, (1884) 110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274; United
States v. Mosley, (1915) 238 U. S. 383, 35 Sup. Ct. 904, 59 L. Ed. 1355.
72Crandall v. Nevada, (1868) 6 Wall. (U.S.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 745;
Colgate v. Harvey, (1935) 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed. 299;
Williams v. Fears, (1900) 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. 128, 45 L. Ed. 186.
73(1920) 254 .U. S. 281, 41 Sup. Ct. 133, 65 L. Ed. 270.
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An injunction against such deportations was upheld by the
court of appeals for the third circuit with the statement :74
"There is no doubt that the right of an individual to pass with
freedom of movement and without molestation between the states
of the union is one of the privileges of federal citizens which is
protected by this clause."
EQUAL PROTECTION
The same doctrine, that private action is not included in the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment, has greatly restricted
the application of the amendment's equal protection clause. In the
Civil Rights Cases75 the Supreme Court struck down Congressional
legislation which forbade discrimination against negroes in places
of public entertainment and transportation, such as inns and rail-
roads. And the doctrine there announced has been followed in
more recent decisions also.76 The Court expected that the rights
of persons aggrieved "may presumably be vindicated by resort to
the laws of the state for redress ;,77 an expectation which has not
been fulfilled.
Notwithstanding these facts, the equal protection clause has
been of some slight benefit to the negro. The Court has per-
sistently struck down attempts to prevent negroes from serving
on juries, although without much practical result. At first the
states passed laws expressly excluding negroes; they were promptly
held void.78  Then more subtle attempts at exclusion were prac-
ticed. But when it appeared that jury commissioners had dis-
criminated against negroes, even though the laws were free from
criticism, the Supreme Court reversed convictions of negroes so
obtained, whether the discrimination had been practiced with regard
to grand or petit juries, or both.79 But the Court made it very clear
that the Constitution did not require that any negro must actually
sit on a jury trying another negro; it required only that persons
74(C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1939) 101 F. 2d 774 affirming (D. N.J. 1938) 25 F.
Supp. 127 now awaiting decision by the United States Supreme Court.
75(1883) 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.70See Hodges v. United States, (1906) 203 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 6, 51
L. Ed. 65; Butts v. Merchants Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 126, 33 Sup. Ct.
964, 57 L. Ed. 1422 and cases cited in notes 62, 73 supra.
77(1883) 109 U. S. 3, 17, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.
76Strauder v. West Virginia, (1880) 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664;
Bush v. Kentucky, (1883) 107 U. S. 110, 1 Sup. Ct. 625, 27 L. Ed. 354.79Neal v. Delaware, (1881) 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567; Carter v.
Texas, (1900) 177 U. S. 442, 20 Sup. Ct. 687, 44 L. Ed. 839; Rogers v.
Alabama, (1904) 192 U. S. 226, 24 Sup. Ct. 257, 48 L. Ed. 417; Martin
v. Texas, (1906) 200 U. S. 316, 26 Sup. Ct. 338, 50 L. Ed. 497.
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not be excluded from service on account of their race.80 Conse-
quently, when the state denied that there had been such discrimina-
tion, and no evidence was introduced by the defendant to establish
it, the Court refused to interfere.8 ' However, where the proof of
discrimination is strong, the Supreme Court will not feel precluded
by a finding by the state courts negativing discrimination. In the
second Scottsboro case, Norris v. Alabama, 2 the Supreme Court
analyzed the evidence for itself and concluded that the mere denial
by jury commissioners of any intent to discriminate could not be
accepted in the face of a long history of exclusion of negroes.
These successive rulings make it harder for the state to prac-
tice discrimination. But the custom which prevails in many states
of striking the names of prospective talesmen, makes it very easy
for the prosecution to eliminate all negroes. Actual discrimina-
tion, in short, has not yet been stopped.
There are other fields in which discrimination has been at-
tempted. They are those of housing, railroad accommodations and
schools. Sometimes the laws themselves discriminate; more often
the wrong is done by prejudiced administrators.83 The Supreme
Court has disapproved both sorts, but declared segregation to be
no discrimination, when the facilities offered both races are sub-
stantially the same. Thus the Court voided laws which created
negro districts in cities,8 4 but has upheld those compelling separate
railroad accommodations for negroes and whites,85 and those re-
quiring separate public schools. 86 The question of what constitutes
&oSee Virginia v. Rives, (1879) 100 U. S. 313, 323, 25 L. Ed. 667;
Shibuya Jugiro v. Brush, (1891) 140 U. S. 291, 11 Sup. Ct. 770, 35 L. Ed.
510.
s'Smith v. Mississippi, (1896) 162 U. S. 592, 16 Sup. Ct. 900, 40 L. Ed.
1082; Tarrance v. Florida, (1903) 188 U. S. 519, 23 Sup. Ct. 402, 47 L. Ed.
572; Brownfield v. South Carolina, (1903) 189 U. S. 426, 23 Sup. Ct. 513,
47 L. Ed. 882; Martin v. Texas, (1906) 200 U. S. 316, 26 Sup. Ct. 338,
50 L. Ed. 497.82(1935) 294 U. S. 587, 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074; to the same
effect are Hollis v. Oklahoma, (1935) 295 U. S. 394, 55 Sup. Ct. 784, 79 L.
Ed. 1500; Hale v. Kentucky, (1938) 303 U. S. 613, 58 Sup. Ct. 753, 82
L. Ed. 1050; Pierre v. Louisiana, (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 536.83See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30
L. Ed. 220.
84Buchanan v. Warley, (1917) 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed.
149; City of Richmond v. Deans, (1930) 281 U. S. 704, 50 Sup. Ct. 407,
74 L. Ed. 1128; Harmon v. Taylor, (1927) 273 U. S. 668, 47 Sup. Ct. 471,
71 L. Ed. 831.85Plessy v. Ferguson, (1896) 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L.
Ed. 256 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, (1900)
179 U. S. 388, 21 Sup. Ct. 101. 45 L. Ed. 244.96Gong Lum v. Rice, (1927) 275 U. S. 78, 48 Sup. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed.
172. The case involved a Chinese child, but the principle is applicable to all
kinds of segregation.
Whether the Supreme Court would uphold a law forbidding the teach-
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equal accommodations is a troublesome one and has not been
definitely determined.87 In the recent case of Missouri ex rel
Gaines v. Canada as the Court compelled Missouri University to
admit a negro as a law student, and held it to be a denial of equal
protection to require him to go out of the state for such education,
even though the state paid the tuition fees. Justices McReynolds
and Butler dissented.
Certain kinds of apparent discrimination have withstood chal-
lenge because the Court was able to find a theoretical equality in
the laws complained of. Thus, mixed marriages may be forbid-
den,"" and adultery between the races punished more severely than
that between persons of the same race."', And the Court has ap-
proved laws punishing alien ownership of real estate9' on grounds
peculiar to the state's power over land.
Moreover, it is well settled that the equal protection clause
has no direct effect whatever on private persons. Therefore the
Court refused to pass on the validity of a covenant against the sale
of land to negroes,9 2 and on the ejection of a negro from a train."
It is interesting to note that following the recent Constitutional
Convention held in New York, an anti-discrimination clause was
adopted which forbids private persons to deprive anyone of his
"civil rights" because of his race or religion." If this proposal is
ing of whites and negroes together in a private school is not clear. Berea
College v. Kentucky, (1908) 211 U. S. 45, 29 Sup. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81 is no
authority, since the Supreme Court upheld such a law only because the
state court had decided the case on a non-federal ground: that the state
could impose any restriction upon the right of one of its own corporations
to teach. Justices Harlan and Day dissented; Justices Moody and Holmes
concurred in the result only.
67In McCabe v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., (1914) 235 U. S. 151, 35
Sup. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169, the Court said that a state law was void which
prohibited negroes from sharing accommodations with whites, and which
permitted the railroad to provide dining car and sleeping car service only
for whites. In Cummings v. Board of Education, (1899) 175 U. S. 528, 20
Sup. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262 the Court refused to enjoin maintenance of a
public high school for whites, although negro high schools had been closed,
since there was no evidence of an intent to discriminate.
'(1938) 305 U. S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232.
",State v. Tutty, (S.D. Ga. 1890) 41 Fed. 753; Scott v. State, (1869)
39 Ga. 321; Kinney v. Commonwealth, (1878) 30 Gratt. (Va.) 858.
"2Pace v. Alabama, (1883) 106 U. S. 583, 1 Sup. Ct. 637, 27 L. Ed. 207.
,"Terrace v. Thompson, (1923) 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed.
255; Porterfield v. Webb, (1923) 263 U. S. 225, 44 Sup. Ct. 21, 68 L. Ed.
278: Webh v. O'Brien, (1923) 263 U. S. 313, 44 Sup. Ct. 112, 68 L. Ed. 318;
Frick v. Webb, (1923) 263 U. S. 326, 44 Sup. Ct. 115, 68 L. Ed. 323.
fl-'Corrigan v. Buckley, (1926) 271 U. S. 323, 46 Sup. Ct. 521, 70 L.
Ed. 969.
2" Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., (1910) 218 U. S. 71, 30 Sup. Ct.
667, 54 L. Ed. 936.
L"New York Constitution, art. I sec. 11.
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implemented by punitive legislation, it may go far toward prevent-
ing the various kinds of discrimination practiced even in the North.
While we have been discussing discrimination against the
negro, it must be borne in mind that there is discrimination against
various other minorities and that the equal protection clause, as
far as it goes, protects them also. It remains to be seen, however,
how far this clause would extend to protect minorities against some
of the forms of discrimination now being practiced in Germany-
especially since the federal government is not bound by any equal
protection clause. Let us hope that the good sense of the American
people will never let such a situation arise.
IV. IN Am oF THOSE AccusED OF CPIME
It was the purpose of many of the provisions of the original
constitution and of the Bill of Rights to protect persons accused
of crime. These safeguards are essential to liberty, even though
they sometimes seem to hamper prosecution of the guilty; for
unjust enforcement of the criminal law has always been a favorite
instrument of tyranny. The founding fathers were well aware of
this truth; recent events abroad should sear it forever into our
memories. Our fundamental law assures protection at various
stages of criminal proceedings, omitting only the right to appeal.
Most state constitutions have similar provisions. But the federal
courts will not directly review violations of their provisions and,
as we have seen, 5 the Supreme Court has, to only a very limited
extent, considered infringement of these guaranties to be a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. We
shall take up the principal guaranties in the order in which they
are likely to be used by a defendant, rather than in that in which
they appear in the Constitution.
INDICTMENT
According to the fifth amendment no one may be prosecuted
for a crime, capital or "infamous," except after indictment by a
grand jury. All offenses punishable by imprisonment in a peni-
tentiary or at hard labor are considered to be "infamous."' 6 Aliens,
95See notes 13-19 supra.
,4The general rule was laid down in Ex parte Wilson, (1885) 114 U. S.
417, 5 Sup. Ct. 935, 29 L. Ed. 89, and Mackin v. United States, (1886) 117
U. S. 348, 6 Sup. Ct. 777, 29 L. Ed. 909. It was extended to cover a punish-
ment of sixty days in a penitentiary in Wong Wing v. United States. (1896)
163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 977, 41 L. Ed. 140; and in United States v.
Moreland, (1922) 258 U. S. 433, 42 Sup. Ct. 368, 66 L. Ed. 700 to punishment
in the District of Columbia workhouse at hard labor for six months upon a
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as well as citizens are entitled to the protection of this provision.
Whereas they may be subjected to temporary detention as an
incident to deportation, they may not be actually imprisoned as for
a crime, unless first indicted.
7
This guaranty, however, does not hold in the insular posses-
sions such as Hawaii and Puerto Rico,9 since the Supreme Court
arrived at the conclusion that Congress might prescribe how much
of the constitution should be applicable to them.9 A contrary con-
clusion was reached in the case of Alaska,100 that territory being
considered an integral part of the United States.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY'
At the threshold of any trial the question may arise, has this
defendant been tried before for the same offense? The fifth amend-
ment, as well as the constitutions of most states, contain a prohibi-
tion against "double jeopardy," intended to prevent such second
trial. But, like so many other constitutional provisions, this one
also must not be taken too literally. A second trial is proper,
when it results from the defendant's own action, as, for example,
a motion for a new trial or an appeal,'10 2 or when it is held in a
jurisdiction different from the one in which the first trial took
place. 10 3 And, at least in the absence of a state constitutional pro-
vision (as in Connecticut), there can be a second trial after an
appeal by the state on legal questions.104
conviction for neglecting to support minor children. In the case last cited,
Justices Brandeis, Holmes and Taft dissented on the ground that imprison-
ment in the workhouse for an offense not deemed serious could not be con-
sidered infamous.97Wong Wing v. United States, (1896) 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 977,
41 L. Ed. 140.
[15Hawaii v. Mankichi, (1903) 190.U. S. 197, 23 Sup. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed.
1016 and Dorr v. United States, (1904) 195 U. S. 138, 24 Sup. Ct. 808, 49
L. Ed. 128. Cf. Balzac v. Porto Rico, (1922) 258 U. S. 298, 42 Sup. Ct.
343, 66 L. Ed. 627.OOThis, of course, was the problem of the Insular cases. See Downes v.
Bidwell, (1901) 182 U. S. 244, 21 Sup. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088.
20ORasmussen v. United States, (1905) 197 U. S. 516, 25 Sup. Ct. 514,
49 L. Ed. 862.
0'0 For an extensive discussion of this subject see Problems Relating to
the Bill of Rights, (1938) 6 New York State Constitutional Convention Re-
port 77-104.
102See United States v. Ball, (1896) 163 U. S. 662, 16 Sup. Ct. 1192,
41 L. Ed. 300.lo3United States v. Lanza, (1922) 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141, 67
L. Ed. 314-but many states, by statute, prohibit such second trial. See
Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev.
1309.
104Palko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L.
Ed. 288. In this case the first trial resulted in a conviction for manslaughter;
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EX POST FACTO LAWS
Another question which may arise before the trial begins, is
whether there has been any change in the law since the crime was
committed. For both states and federal government are forbidden
by the original constitution from changing the law so as to punish
an act which had not been illegal when committed, or from increas-
ing the punishment which was prescribed at the time the crime
occurred.' 0 5 But, while the Supreme Court has consistently set
itself against any attempt to evade this salutary guaranty, it has
not allowed it to be made the basis for mere obstruction. Thus
many specific changes in procedure have been permitted to affect
criminal trials, even though the challenged procedure had not pre-
vailed at the time the offense under scrutiny was committed. 08
The guaranty applies, as we have seen, 07 only to cases that are
of a criminal character. On the whole this is a sensible rule, since,
in civil matters, there are many occasions when retroactive laws are
necessary and desirable. Protection against extreme instances of
such retroactive legislation has been afforded by the due process
clause. 108 But, since deportation is not considered to be punish-
ment for crime, an alien may be deported under a law enacted
after his arrival, for an act which had not been a ground for
deportation under the law in force when he arrived or even when
the act was committed. 0 9 Much injustice has resulted from this
anomaly.
the state appealed because of errors in the charge. The second trial resulted
in a first degree conviction. The United States Supreme Court held that
giving the state the right to appeal on issues of law was no denial of due
process. A similar Philippine provision has, however, been held to be a viola-
tion of the express federal guaranty: Kepner v. United States, (1904) 195
U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114 (a five-to-four decision).
105See Calder v. Bull, (1797) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648; Thomp-
son v. Utah, (1898) 170 U. S. 343, 18 Sup. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061. For a
recent example see Lindsey v. Washington, (1937) 301 U. S. 397, 57 Sup.
Ct. 797, 81 L. Ed. 1182.
106Change in qualifications of witnesses: Hopt v. -Utah, (1884) 110 U. S.
574, 4 Sup. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262.
Change in states' right to appeal: Mallett v. North Carolina, (1901)
181 U. S. 589, 21 Sup. Ct. 730, 45 L. Ed. 1015.
Change in manner of carrying out death sentence: Malloy v. South
Carolina, (1915) 237 U. S. 180, 35 Sup. Ct. 507, 59 L. Ed. 905.107 See note 22, supra.08See Nichols v. Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71
L. Ed. 1184; Untermyer v. Anderson, (1928) 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct.
353, 72 L. Ed. 645; Coolidge v. Long, (1931) 282 ,U. S. 582, 51 Sup. Ct. 306,
75 L. Ed. 562. But see contra: Milliken v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S.
15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. Ed. 809; United States v. Hudson, (1937) 299
U. S. 498, 57 Sup. Ct. 309, 81 L. Ed. 370.
'
09Bugajewitz v. Adams, (1913) 228 U. S. 585, 33 Sup. Ct. 607, 57
L. Ed. 978; Mahler v. Eby, (1924) 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283, 68 L. Ed.
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TRIAL By JURY
A criminal trial in the federal courts must take place before a
jury of twelve. Most states have similar provisions, limited some-
times to particular kinds of crime, sometimes simply continuing
existing practice. But despite the plain language of the sixth
amendment, Congress may provide for trials without a jury in
police courts in the District of Columbia, so long as the offense
involved is a minor one."" However, serious crimes such as con-
spiracy arising out of a labor dispute,"' or even such as driving
an automobile recklessly" 2 may not be tried without a jury.
In the recent Clawans Case,1 3 however, the Court, over the
dissent of Justices McReynolds and Butler, held that trial by
jury might be dispensed with where the charge was that of selling
merchandise without a license, even though the punishment might
be a fine of $300 or imprisonment for ninety days. The majority
recognized that, regardless of the nature of the crime, jury trial
might be required if the punishment imposed was sufficiently
severe, although no limits were indicated by the Court. The
minority were of the opinion that, since trial by jury was guaran-
teed by the seventh amendment in civil cases involving more than
$20, a like right should be granted in criminal cases when a sub-
stantial fine might be imposed.
The same rule has been adopted with regard to the application
of the jury provision to aliens and the insular possessions as was
applied in the case of indictment." 4
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Of prime importance to a defendant is the right to be repre-
sented by counsel. It has been expressly guaranteed by the sixth
amendment; and most states have similar provisions. There can
be no doubt, therefore, that denial of this right requires reversal
of conviction, though if the case arise in a state, the Supreme
Court can intervene only when it concludes, as in the first Scotts-
549. Cf. Johannessen v. United States, (1912) 225 .U. S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct.
613, 56 L. Ed. 1066 and Luria v.- United States, (1913) 231 U. S. 9, 34
Sup. Ct. 10, 58 L Ed. 101 (actions to cancel naturalization certificate).
"
0 Schick v. United States, (1904) 195 U. S. 65, 24 Sup. Ct. 826, 49
L. Ed. 99.
"'Callan v. Wilson, (1888) 127 U. S. 540, 8 Sup. Ct 1301, 32 L. Ed. 223.
12District of Columbia v. Colts, (1930) 282 U. S. 63, 51 Sup. Ct. 52, 75
L. Ed. 177.
"sDistrict of Columbia v. Clawans, (1937) 300 U. S. 617, 57 Sup. Ct.
660, 81 L. Ed. 843. See also Bailey v. United States, (App. D.C. 1938)
98 Fed. 306, soliciting prostitution.
114 See notes 97-100 supra.
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boro Case,"' that such denial has amounted to a deprivation of due
process. Even when, due to delay, there was no appeal, denial
of counsel by a federal court, if not acquiesced in by the defendant,
will so vitiate a conviction that it may be challenged at any time
by writ of habeas corpus."'
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES
Another right expressly given by the sixth amendment is that
a defendant be confronted with the witnesses against him. The
Supreme Court held it to be a violation of this provision for Con-
gress to provide that, in prosecutions for receiving stolen goods,
the fact of theft might be established merely by proving the con-
viction of the thief, without evidence of the actual occurrences.
17
SELF INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment, and most state constitutions, forbid com-
pulsory questioning of a person about his own criminal activities.
This guaranty has been much criticized as constituting an unneces-
sary limitation on the efficiency of prosecutions, its critics believ-
ing that under modem conditions it protects the guilty rather than
the innocent."l 8 So as to obtain needed testimony, legislatures have
frequently extended immunity to persons compelled to testify." 9
Nevertheless, so long as prosecutors still bully and confuse accused
persons when they take the stand, it will continue to be necessary
to retain this protection. The subject is too complicated to permit
adequate discussion in the limits of a paper such as this. And the
issue it raises is one of general policy rather than of constitutional
law.
A curious, though probably unsound, 20 application of this
principle is its identification with the fourth amendment in barring
115Powell v. Alabama, (1932) 287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed.
158. See Howard v. Dodd, (D. Ind. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 844; in that case a
state conviction was set aside by a writ of habeas corpus four years after the
conviction.
1Ojohnson v. Zerbst, (1938) 304 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed.
1461 (justice McReynolds and Butler dissented because they believed the
evidence established a waiver).717Kirby v. United States, (1899) 174 U. S. 47, 19 Sup. Ct. 574, 43 L.
Ed. 890.
"sSee Cardozo, j., in Palko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 326.
58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288; 4 Wigmore, Evidence, (2d ed. 1923) sec.
2251, pp. 819 if; Problems Relating to the Judicial Administration and Or-
ganization, (1938) 9 New York State Constitutional Convention Report
920, 929 ff.
"19See 6 Jones, Evidence (2d ed. 1926) sec. 2486, pp. 4918 ff.
220See 4 Wigmore, Evidence (1st ed. 1904) 3122-3127.
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the admission of evidence illegally seized. We shall now consider
that subject.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and
seizures; it is silent on the consequences that flow from a violation
of its provisions. Originally such Violation was ignored in the
course of a prosecution, and the government was allowed to use
illegally seized evidence. 121 Later the technique was developed,1 22
which is now well established, under which a defendant moves
before trial to suppress illegally seized evidence. Failure, in a
proper case, to grant such a motion will result in reversal of con-
viction ;123 and this will also follow if the evidence is received
despite the defendant's failure to make the motion before trial,
provided he learned of the seizure first at the trial.12- However,
this is the rule only when the seizure was a wrongful one and only
when made under federal authority. Thus evidence may be re-
ceived although illegally taken by private persons'125 or by state
officers, unless these were cooperating with a federal agency.'1
2
There are circumstances, too, in which a search may be valid,
although made without a warrant, as at the time of a lawful
arrest,1 27 or when it is that of a moving automobile under condi-
121See Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, (1921) 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 361.
122Weeks v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58
L. Ed. 652, first approved this practice. See notes 123, 124 infra.
'
23Gouled v. United States, (1921) 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65
L. Ed. 647; Amos v. United States, (1921) 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266,
65 L. Ed. 654; Byars v. United States, (1927) 273 U. S. 28,47 Sup. C1. 248,
71 L. Ed. 520; Gambino v. United States, (1927) 275 U. S. 310, 48 Sup. Ct.
137, 72 L. Ed. 293; Nathanson v. United States, (1933) 290 U. S. 41, 54
Sup. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159.
'
24Agnello v. United States, (1925) 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L.
Ed. 145.
125Burdeau v. McDowell, (1921) 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65
L. Ed. 1048.
'26Weeks v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L.
Ed. 650. See Byars v. United States, (1931) 273 U. S. 28, 33, 47 Sup. Ct.
248, 71 L. Ed. 520; cf. Center v. United States, (1915) 267 U. S. 575, 45
Sup. Ct. 230, 69 L. Ed. 795. The rule is otherwise if the state officers co-
operate with the federal: Byars v. United States, (1927) 273 U. S. 28,
47 Sup. Ct. 574, 71 L. Ed. 520; Gambino v. United States, (1927) 275 U. S.
310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137, 72 L. Ed. 293. These holdings result from the refusal
of the Supreme Court to include freedom from search within the rights
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See note
15, supra.
127Adams v. New York, (1904) 192 U. S. 585, 595, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48
L. Ed. 575.
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tions which indicate that a crime is being committed by the
occupants.'-"
An important aspect of this problem is the ruling that not
even a search warrant can validate a search for matter that is
evidentiary only.1 29 A search may be made only for material
illegally possessed, such as counterfeit money, or for the instru-
mentalities of crime, such as an unregistered still. Yet in Ohnstead
v. United States,"' though by a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court held that any kind of evidence was admissible if obtained
by wire-tapping, and this even though the wire-tapping was
criminal in the state in which it took place. This decision rested
on the double ground that wire-tapping was not a "search" and
that the rule against the exclusion of evidence applied only when
it was obtained in violation of a constitutional provision. How-
ever, in the recent Nardone Case,'31 the last point was ignored and
evidence obtained-by wire-tapping was held inadmissible because
the wire-tapping violated the Federal Communications Act.
The rule that evidence illegally obtained may not be used has
been criticized severely on the ground that it benefits only the
guilty. 13 2 Yet it is clear that, unless such evidence be excluded,
the protection given by the Constitution, the value of which is not
disputed even by the critics of the "federal rule," becomes mean-
ingless. Suits for damages offer no effective substitute; it is idle
to expect criminal prosecution of officials the fruits of whose
crime have been used by the very persons charged with initiating
prosecutions. In this dilemma the federal rule provides the more
satisfactory solution. As Mr. Justice Holmes has said:
"It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that
end that all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable
that the government should not itself foster and pay for other
128But see Husty v. United States, (1931) 282 U. S. 694, 51 Sup. Ct.
240, 75 L Ed. 629; Carroll v. United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup.
Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543.
129Gouled v. United States, (19.21) 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65
L. Ed. 647.
13 (1928) 277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944; Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, Butler and Stone each wrote dissenting opinions. -
131(1937) 302 U. S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314; Justices Suther-
land and McReynolds dissented solely on a question of construction.
132See Cardozo, J., in People v. Defore, (1926) 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E.
585; Dist. Atty. Dewey of New York, N. Y. Times June 13, 1938 at 1:8.
See contra: Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained through
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 11; Governor
Lehman of New York, N. Y. Times June 14, 1938 at 1:8. See also Broad-
hurst, -Use of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, (1936) 24
Ky. L. J. 191; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and
Seizure, (1929) 13 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 1.
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crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be
obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime
I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the
same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of dis-
approval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in
future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my
part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part."133
This rule is followed in less than half the states, but it has not
been definitely rejected in all the others. 34 In a few states the
subject is regulated by statute or constitutional provision.135 In
the Constitutional Convention held in New York in 1938, ex-
tensive debate resulted in the rejection of the federal rule, partly
on the ground that it was undesirable, partly because it was felt
that the subject should be handled by statute rather than consti-
tutional enactment.13" The convention adopted a novel provision
relating to wire-tapping, however, one which forbids the practice
except when authorized by a court order upon an affidavit setting
forth facts justifying it."37  The machinery thus set up is similar
"33(1928) 277 U. S. 438, 470, 48 Sup. Ct. 536, 72 L. Ed. 944.
"34States which follow the federal rule: Hart v. State, (1925) 89 Fla.
202, 103 So. 633; State v. Arregui, (1927) 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788; People
v. Castree, (1924) 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112; Flum v. State, (1923) 193 Ind.
585, 141 N. E. 353; Youman v. Commonwealth, (1920) 189 Ky. 152, 244 S.
V. 860; People v. Marxhausen, (1919) 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 537; Owens
v. State, (1923) 133 Miss. 752, 98 So. 233; State v. Owens, (1923) 302 Mo.
348, 259 S. W. 100; State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, (1921) 59 Mont.
'00, 198 Pac. 362; Hess v. State, (1921) 84 Okla. 73, 202 Pac. 310; State
v. Gooden, (1930) 57 S. D. 619, 234 N. W. 610; Hughes v. State, (1921)
145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588; State v. Gibbons, (1922) 118 Wash. 171,
203 Pac. 390; State v. Wills, (1927) 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261; Hoyer
v. State, (1923) 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 189; State v. Peterson, (1920)
27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342.
In some states the rule applies only to matters purely evidentiary, not
to contraband: State v. Agalos, (1919) 79 N. H. 241, 107 Atl. 314; State
v. Bluth, (1923) 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W. 789; State v. Simmons, (1922)
183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E. 591; State v. Chester, (1925) 46 R. I. 485, 129 Ati.
596-but in the last two cases the search was held lawful.
In a few states the question has not really been reconsidered since the
development of the practice of moving to suppress: Johnson v. State,
(1916) 152 Ga. 271, 109 S. E. 662; State v. Choroszy, (1923) 122 Me. 283,
119 At. 662; State v. Merra, (1927) 103 N. J. L. 361, 137 Atl. 575.
13Maryland, Code (1935) Art. 35, sec. 4a (bars use in misdemeanor
cases).
Michigan, Constitution art. II sec. 10 (1936) (permits use as to certain
dangerous weapons).
Texas, C. C. P. (1925, 1929) art. 727a (bars use in all cases).
In Mississippi a statute permitting use in liquor cases was held un-
constitutional: Orick v. State, (1925) 140 Miss. 184, 105 So. 465.
"36See N. Y. Times (1938) June 19 at IV 10:1, 29 at 1:8. But legisla-
tion is pending to make the federal rule applicable.
137New York, Constitution (1939) art. I sec. 12.
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to that for search warrants. It will be interesting to observe how
the courts will enforce this provision.
FAIR TRIALS
The prime object of a criminal trial is, of course, to determine
guilt or innocence by the application of legal rules. This is the
essence of the due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment ;"'s the defendant is entitled to a fair trial. In the federal
courts, however, it is seldom necessary to fall back upon so broad
a provision as this, on account of the numerous specific guarantees
of the fifth and sixth amendments we have already considered.1 38
But the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has
often been invoked as the last protection available to a defendant
convicted in a state court, usually the only contention by which ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of the United States is possible. In a
number of famous cases the Supreme Court has refused to re-
verse.140 Sometimes it has even refused to take jurisdiction.'4 '
1s8 See 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1st ed. 1833) 681.
139See notes 114-131 supra. For reversals on general grounds see:
Aldridge v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 308, 51 Sup. Ct. 470, 75 L. Ed.
1054 (trial court refused to permit inquiry into prejudice of talesmen against
negroes) ; Quercia v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 466, 53 Sup. Ct.
689, 77 L. Ed. 1321 (trial court characterized defendant as unworthy
of belief) ; Bergen v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S. 78, 55 Sup. Ct. 629,
79 L. Ed. 1314 (improper questions and summations by prosecuting attorney).
See also Alford v. United States, (1931) 282 U. S. 687, 51 Sup. Ct. 218, 75
L. Ed. 624 (refusal to permit defense to show that government's witness was
in custody of federal authorities as foundation for claim of bias).
14OThus it rejected the contention in the Chicago Haymarket case that
the jury was unfairly chosen: Spies v. Illinois, (1887) 123 U. S. 131, 8
Sup. Ct. 22, 31 L. Ed. 80. Over the dissent of Justices Holmes and Hughes
it denied a writ of habeas corpus to Leo Frank, despite evidence of mob
feeling so high as to disturb the calm of the trial: Frank v. Magnum,
(1915) 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969 (but see a different
result reached later, note 142 infra). And in Snyder v. Massachusetts.
(1933) 291 U. S. 97, 54 Sup. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674, while all the justices
agreed that the right of a defendant to be present during his trial is funda-
mental, five of the justices were of the opinion that in the particular case
defendant had suffered no harm by not being present while the jury had
viewed the scene of the crime; Justices Sutherland, Brandeis, Butler and
Roberts dissented.
14 11n 1927 neither Mr. Justice Holmes nor Mr. Justice Stone saw
sufficient merit in the claim made by counsel for Sacco and Vanzetti that
the trial judge had been unduly prejudiced to grant a stay of execution so
that the whole court might pass on an application for certiorari. See
Fraenkel, The Sacco Vanzetti Case (1931) 178-182. (Mr. Justice Brandeis
refused to entertain the application because members of his family had in-
terested themselves in the case; no other justice was available.) The Court
in the third Scottsboro Case denied an application for certiorari which rested
on a refusal to transfer the case to the federal courts under 28 U. S. C. A.
74, and on a claim of denial of due process because of the judge's charge.
Patterson v. Alabama, (1937) 302 U. S. 733, 58 Sup. Ct. 124, 82 L. Ed. 566.
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The Court has interfered, however, in other instances on the
ground that the trial has been vitiated by some gross denial of the
defendant's rights. In Moore v. Dempsey,1 42 it ruled that, when
it was claimed a mob had, in effect, made a trial an instrument of
its desire to lynch, a writ of habeas corpus might not be dismissed,
but evidence must be taken of the facts. In the Mooney Case,'43
it held that the state must afford a hearing to determine whether
the defendant had been convicted by the deliberate use of perjured
testimony. The Supreme Court has not yet handed down a ruling
on whether a like result will follow even if the state had at the
time of the trial no knowledge that the testimony was perjured.1 44
In the first Scottsboro Case, as we have already noted,145 convic-
tions were reversed because the accused had been denied an oppor-
tunity to obtain counsel. The Supreme Court has also reversed
where a judge who imposed a fine was paid by being allowed to
keep part of all fines he imposed.24 In Brozum v. Mississippi,147
convictions were set aside because the only evidence against the
defendants had been obtained from them by torture. Chief justice
Hughes, reviewing the requirements of due process, said in that
case:
"The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the
witness stand. The state may not permit an accused to be hurried
to conviction under mob domination-where the whole proceeding
is but a mask-without supplying corrective process. The state
may not deny to the accused the aid of counsel. Nor may a state,
through the action of its officers, contrive a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is 'but used as a means of de-
priving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of
court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be per-
jured.' And the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state
authorities have contrived a conviction resting solely upon con-
fessions obtained by violence."'148
",2(1923) 261 U. S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543, Justices Mc-
Reynolds and Sutherland dissenting.14SMooney v. Holohan, (1935) 294 U. S. 103, 55 Sup. Ct. 340, 79 L.
Ed. 791. The state supreme court then appointed a referee who decided
against Mooney. His decision was confirmed: Mooney v. Smith, (1937) 10
Cal. 2nd 1, 73 P. 2nd 554, Langdon, J., dissenting. Certiorari denied (1938)
59 Sup. Ct. 61, Black and Reed, JJ., dissenting. The Court also refused to
issue an original writ of habeas corpus: Ex parte Mooney, (1938) 59 Sup.
Ct. 246.144In Jones v. Kentucky, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 335 habeas
corpus was issued because the state had failed to provide judicial machinery
to correct a conviction based on perjury, even when there was no proof that
the prosecutor knew of the perjury.145See note 115, supra.
146Tumey v. Ohio, (1927) 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749.
147(1936) 297 U. S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682.
18 (1936) 297 ,U. S. 278, 285, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682.
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Certain general principles have also come to be recognized as
integral parts of due process in criminal cases. First, the law
under which a prosecution is conducted must be sufficiently definite
to advise the public what acts are punishable under it.1' 9 Second,
the evidence must prove the commission of a crime.15 0 Third, the
evidence must establish the crime charged in the indictment.'
Presumably, also, the judge's charge must not permit a finding of
guilty in violation of the last of these principles; perhaps it must
conform to the standards of fairness generally recognized in the
state. Until now, however, the Supreme Court has avoided con-
sidering these questions. The extent to which it will reverse a
state conviction because of errors in the charge therefore remains
uncertain.
Even though deportation proceedings are not considered
criminal in character, a fair hearing in these is essential. 152
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
While an appeal in criminal cases is generally allowed as of
right by federal and state laws, there is no constitutional guaranty
of that right in the constitution of the United States, nor in those
of many of the states. And the Supreme Court of the United
States has often pointed out that the right to appeal is not essential
to due process.15 3 Nevertheless, when appeal is not available either
because of lapse of time or for other reasons, the state must pro-
vide a method for the judicial review of constitutional issues.
Failing it, the federal courts will interpose by writ of habeas
corpus. 5 4 However, state courts need not entertain an application
for such a writ, when the constitutional question could have been
raised by appeal but was not. 5'
149 See Zakonaite v. Wolf, (1912) 226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L. Ed.
218. Cf. Chiuye Inovye v. Carr, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 46.
:
5 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., (1921) 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup.
Ct. 298, 65 L. Ed. 516; Herndon v. Lowry, (1937) 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup.
Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 618.
'
5
'Fiske v. Kansas, (1927) 274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed.
1108.
"2'deJonge v. Oregon, (1937) 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed.
278.
153See McKane v. Durston, (1894) 153 U. S. 684, 687, 14 Sup. Ct.
913, 38 L. Ed. 867; District of Columbia v. Clawans, (1937) 300 U. S.
617, 627, 57 Sup. Ct. 660, 81 L. Ed. 843.
154See notes 143, 144 supra.
'
55Woolsey v. Best, (1936) 299 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 2, 81 L. Ed. 3.
In the second Herndon Case, Herndon v. Lowry, (1937) 301 U. S. 242.
57 Sup. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066, the constitutional issue was presented
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V. IN Am OF PROPERTY
While we are here concerned primarily with personal rights,
no review of our subject would be intelligible which completely
ignored property rights. We shall pass with a bare mention the
requirement of the fifth amendment that private property may not
be taken for public purposes without compensation and discuss
only the due process clauses of that amendment and the fourteenth.
Property rights are, of course, entitled to the same kind of
protection against procedural due process as are persons accused
of crime. Generally it is enough that the owner of the property
or business affected be given a fair opportunity to litigate the issues
involved. The courts have often set aside rulings of administrative
tribunals, such as rate making bodies, because they believed in-
sufficient notice of the precise issue to be decided had been given
the party interested.";" When such notice has been given, however,
the courts will not impose any particular form of procedure on ad-
ministrative tribunals. 57 The recent increase in number and func-
tion of these has been attracting much attention to this problem.' 8
Indeed, the Constitutional Convention held in New York in 1938
adopted proposals to insure judicial review of certain quasi-judicial
administrative decisions both on the law and on the facts, proposals
fortunately rejected at the polls. 1 5
In addition to procedural matters of due process, the courts
have, in the last few decades, invoked that clause against laws im-
posing taxes and various forms of regulation, on the ground that
arbitrary laws are really not laws at all. And, in determining
what laws are arbitrary, judges have allowed their own social and
economic prejudices to control. Thus on the altar of due process
the Supreme Court has slaughtered numerous laws enacted for the
protection of the underprivileged: laws outlawing yellow dog con-
on habeas corpus after the same issue had been reviewed on appeal: Herndon
v. State, (1934) 178 Ga. 832, 174 S. E. 597; (1934) 179 Ga. 597, 176
S. E. 620, appeal dismissed (1935) 295 U. S. 441, 55 Sup. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed.
1530 (Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo dissenting). But the state court did
not question the propriety of this procedure.
1rOhio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility Comm., (1937) 301 U. S. 292,
57 Sup. Ct. 724, 81 L. Ed. 1093; Morgan v. United States, (1938) 304 U. S.
1, 23, 58 Sup. Ct. 773, 999, 82 L. Ed. 1129.
UN.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904,
82 L. Ed. 1381 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Biles Coleman L. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1938) 98 Fed. (2d) 16; N.L.R.B. v. American Potash & Chemical Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 98 Fed. 2d 488.
'5sSee articles in (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 519 ff.
'
5
,New York Times (1938) Aug. 4 at 1.3; 15 at 1:2, 19 at 20:2;
Nov. 9 at 1:2.
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tracts,160 laws fixing railway and utility rates,161 laws regulating
the hours of labor162 and various businesses,16 3 even, until just the
other day, laws establishing minimum wages. 64 And, while the
Court has already receded from this most extreme position,1 5 it
has not abandoned the principle which underlies all these cases:
that a law violates due process if the purpose it seeks to accomplish
or the method adopted to carry that purpose out appears to the
majority of the judges contrary to the natural rights of business-
men or property owners. In astonishing numbers, decisions in this
class of cases have rested upon the vote of a single justice.6 6
By thus giving to due process a substantive, rather than merely
procedural meaning, the courts have constituted themselves de-
ciders of policy against whom the only appeal is by the slow
method of constitutional amendment or the uncertain pressure of
public opinion. American courts have embarked here upon a
course wholly without precedent in judicial annals; one for which
judges are unsuited by training or experience, a course which has
justly aroused violent resentment, even to the extent of its being
sometimes proposed that the power of judicial review be altogether
abolished.
16 7
'
6OAdair v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277,
52 L. Ed. 436 (Justices McKenna and Holmes dissenting); Coppage v.
Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 (Justices Day,
Holmes, Hughes dissenting).
161See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981; Pacific Gas
& E. R. Co. v. San Francisco, (1923) 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537, 68
L. Ed. 1075; McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 47
Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316; St. Louis O'Fallon R. Co. v. United States,
(1929) 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384, 73 L. Ed. 798; West v. Chesapeake P.
T. Co., (1935) 295 U. S. 662, 55 Sup. Ct. 894, 79 L. Ed. 1640. These cases all
rested on Smyth v. Ames, (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed.
819.
'
62Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49
L. Ed. 937.
'163Adams v. Tanner, (1917) 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed.
1336; Tyson v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed.
718; New State Ice Co. v. Leibman, (1932) 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct.
371, 76 L Ed. 746; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., (1936) 298 U. S.
238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160.
'
64Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct.
394, 67 L. Ed. 785; New York ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead, (1936) 298
U. S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. Ed. 1347.
M6 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U. S. 379, 57
Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703.
1660f the cases cited in notes 162-165 supra, all were five-to-four
decisions except New State Ice Co. v. Leibman and the Adkins Case. (The
latter only because Mr. Justice Brandeis did not participate). For other
such recent decisions see Fraenkel, Five-to-Four Decisions of Supreme
Court, (1935) 2 U. S. Law Week 1010.
167See note 20, supra.
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VI. IN Am OF OPINION
One unlooked for result on the credit side has come out of this
extended interpretation of the due process clause. As we have
already noted, the Supreme Court has, after much hesitation,
finally ruled that certain substantive rights, such as freedom of
speech, of the press, of religion and assembly are so fundamental
that denial of them by a state violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Thus the rights guaranteed by the first
amendment against interference by the central government have
been siphoned into the fourteenth amendment and become pro-
tected against infringement by the states. Strictly speaking, of
course, the Court will not apply the literal provisions of the first
amendment as against state action; it will review state action only
when it has violated the fundamental rights of citizens. This dis-
tinction finds no reflection as yet in the decisions, but it may ex-
plain some instances in which the Court has declined to take juris-
diction of cases which originated in state courts.
These rights specified in the first amendment may all be called
rights of opinion; the right to possess and express one's ideas (be
they religious, political or economic) by speech, in writing or
through meeting with one's fellow men. These are the rights
essential to a democracy, the safeguarding of which is the first duty
of enlightened government. How have they fared in our history?
RELIGIOus FREEDOIm
Full religious liberty has never existed even in the United
States.108 At the time of the Revolution, only Protestants were
fully protected; religious restrictions upon voting and the holding
of office existed in many of the colonies and still to some extent
continuelGO Nor was any attempt made by the constitution or
the early amendments to alter these conditions. 70 In the main,
however, there have been in our history no direct infringements of
religious liberty. Yet the United States has been judicially de-
clared a "Christian country," with various curious consequences
hardly consistent with full religious liberty.'
'"See Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties (1927) 64 ff.
'
5 9See Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities
and Non-Believers in the United States, (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 659, 665, 671.
In several states office holding is restricted to believers in God: Ark. XIX
See. 1; Md. Decl. of R. Sec. 37; N. C. VI Sec. 8; Pa. I Sec. 4. And in many
states atheists are not accepted as witnesses.
'70See Permoli v. New Orleans, (1845) 3 How. (U.S.) 589, 609, 11
L. Ed. 739.
"1'See Church of the Holy Trinity, (1892) 143 U. S. 457, 470, 12
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Practices indulged in as religious may, however, be subject
to state regulation. This fact was established when Mormonism
became a national issue. In upholding convictions for polygamy,
a practice originally commanded by the Mormon Church, Chief
Justice Waite laid down the general rule that religious freedom
cannot be asserted in justification of actions deemed by the legis-
lature contrary to public policy:
"Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions.
they may with practices." '172
Nor may religious beliefs be used as the basis for obtaining
exemption from legal provisions of general application, provi-
sions not designed to interfere with purely religious observances.
Thus those aliens may not become citizens who, on account of their
religious scruples, refuse to pledge military support in time of
war17 1-- and this, though the applicant be a woman or above mili-
tary age! Even the dissenting Justices, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone
and Hughes, did not question Congressional power to exact such
a pledge, but merely doubted that Congress had intended to do
so.
The Court has not yet actually decided that religious freedom
is guaranteed against state action, but it has assumed as much
while holding that the state action complained of did not violate
such freedom. Thus it rejected a claim of pacifists that they be
exempted from the requirement of military training at a state
university, 74 and one made by members of the sect of Jehovah's
Witnesses that they be relieved of the obligation to salute the
flag while attending public school. 175  In these instances the deci-
Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; United States v. Macintosh, (1931) 283 U. S.
605, 625, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302. Cf. Bible reading in schools;
see Hartogensis, note 169 supra, at 678.
172Reynolds v. United States, (1879) 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244, cf.
Davis v. Beason, (1890) 133 U. S. 333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637.
See, however, People v. Cole, (1916) 219 N. Y. 98, 113 N. E. 790 (practice
of medicine in accordance with tenets of Christian Science Church not
in violation of law).
'
73United States v. Schwimmer, (1929) 279 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct.
448, 73 L. Ed. 889; United States v. Macintosh, (1931) 283 U. S. 605, 51
Sup. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302; United States v. Bland, (1931) 283 U. S.
636, 51 Sup. Ct. 569, 75 L. Ed. 1319.
174Hamilton v. Regents, (1934) 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197, 79
L. Ed. 343. This case has been cited, Palko v. Connecticut, (1938) 302
U. S. 319, 324, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288, as authority for including
freedom of religion within those concepts of due process guaranteed against
state action. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923) 262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct.
625, 67 L. Ed. 1042.
175Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, (1938) 96 Cal. 280, 82 P. (2d) 391, cert.
denied (April 24, 1939) ...... Sup. Ct ........ reversing (Cal. App. 1937) 74
P. (2d) 290; Leoles v. Landers, (1937) 184 Ga. 580, 192 S. E. 218, appeal
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sions rested in part on the fact that the state had exerted no
compulsion: the students were not obliged to attend either a
public college or a public school. This, of course, is the doctrine
of the Civil Rights Cases which we have already considered.' 6
The Court held also that no issue of religious liberty was
involved in prosecutions for violation of an ordinance forbidding
distribution of all pamphlets without a permit, where in the
particular instances the pamphlets distributed were religious in
character. 1
77
And an attempt failed which tried to overthrow the Selective
Draft Law of 1917 on the ground that its exemption in favor of
certain sects transgressed the prohibition of the first amendment
against Congressional establishment of any religion." 8
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
These two rights overlap and may best be discussed together.
The fundamental nature of their character has been recognized
in many decisions, though with some limitations born chiefly of
wartime hysteria, which are open to criticism. At an early period
in our history the view was expressed that these guaranties were
designed only to prevent censorship, not to interfere with punish-
ment for words once uttered.1 9  Even Justice Holmes at one
time considered this the chief purpose of the provision. °0  On
the other hand is, of course, the extreme position that no mere
expression of opinion may be punished, nor may even advocacy
of action, so long as no harmful result was actually produced
dismissed (1937) 302 U. S. 656, 58 Sup. Ct. 364, 82 L. Ed. 507; Nicholas
v. Mayor, (Mass. 1937) 7 N. E. (2d) 577; Hering v. State Board of Edu-
cation, (1937) 117 N. J. L. 455, 189 Atl. 629, affd. (1937) 118 N. J. L. 566,
194 Atl. 177, appeal dismissed (1938) 303 U. S. 624, 58 Sup. Ct. 742, 82
L. Ed. 1086; People ex rel. Fisk v. Sandstrom, (1939) 279 N. Y. 523; John-
son v. Town of Deerfield, (D. Mass. 1939) 25 F. Supp. 918, cert. denied
(April 24, 1939) ..... Sup. Ct ....... ; contra, Gobitis v. Minersville School
District, (E.D. Pa. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 581; (E.D. Pa. 1938) 24 F. Supp.
271, now awaiting decision in the circuit court of appeals.
27'3See note 75, supra.
17'Coleman v. Griffin, (1937) 302 U. S. 636, 58 Sup. Ct. 24, 82 L. Ed.495 and Lovell v. Griffin, (1938) 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed.
949. In the Lovell Case the Court reversed the conviction as violation of
freedom of speech and the press. See note 200, infra.
17sArver v. United States, (1918) 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159,
62 L. Ed. 349.
179See Respublica v. Oswals, (1788) 1 DalI. (U.S.) 319, 325, 1 L. Ed.
155. But see contra, Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1st ed. 1868) 421,
422.
80 Patterson v. Colorado, (1907) 205 U. S. 454, 462, 27 Sup. Ct. 556,
51 L. Ed. 879.
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by the advocacy or the words used did not directly incite to
crime. But this view has received no judicial support.1 81
When first confronted, after the World War, with the ex-
tent of the guaranty, the Supreme Court of the United States
rejected both extreme contentions. In the leading Espionage Act
case, Schenck v. United States,1 82 Justice Holmes, for a unanimous
Court, laid down the rule which has come to be known as the
"dear and present danger" rule, and which reads as follows:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight, and that no court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right."'183
It was no doubt the belief of the great liberal judges who
joined in these decisions that individuals would receive by this
formula some real measure of protection from unjust prosecu-
tion. Actually it has proved to be of little practical value in periods
of hysteria, -whether this be caused by war or by labor troubles.
At times such as these, juries are prone to convict on the flimsiest
evidence, regardless of subtle distinctions drawn by judges in
their charges, and appellate courts prove equally ready to overlook
absence of evidence, in the supposed need of the community.
This was illustrated very soon after the enunciation of the clear
and present danger rule itself, in a group of war cases in which
Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented because they believed
the evidence insufficient to justify conviction.'8' Nevertheless, the
isiThis extreme view was rejected even by Chafee, Freedom of Speech
in War Time (1920) 7. He emphasized the social interest in free speech
(37) and urged that "the great interest in free speech should be sacri-
ficed only when the interest in public safety is really imperiled, and not,
as most men believe, when it is barely conceivable that it may be slightly
affected." He preferred Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, (S.D.
N.Y. 1917) 244 Fed. 535 (revd. however, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1917) 246
Fed. 24 on technical grounds) to the "clear and present danger test" of
Holmes, seen notes 182, 183 infra.
182(1919) 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470. See also
Frohwerk v. United States, (1919) 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249, 63 L.
Ed. 561; Debs v. United States, (1919) 249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct. 252,
63 L. Ed. 566. See criticism of some of these cases in Chafee, Freedom
of Speech in War Time (1920) 89 ff.
182249 U. S. 47, 52.
'
8 4Abrams v. United States, (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct.
17, 63 L. Ed. 1173; Schaefer v. United States, (1920) 251 U. S. 466, 40
Sup. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360 (in this case Justice Clarke dissented separate-
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test is probably as good a one as can be devised, provided speech
should ever be punishable where there is no accompanying action.
For a long time it has been doubtful whether the clear and
present danger test is applicable to state criminal syndicalism
laws which were enacted on the assumption that certain kinds of
speech were harmful to the state. For many years, indeed, the
Supreme Court had intimated that freedom of speech and freedom
of the press were not protected by the federal Constitution against
interference by the states.185 When, finally, the Court began to
review convictions under these state laws, it ruled that the legisla-
tive declaration of the necessity of punishing certain kinds of
speech was presumptively controlling. As a matter of fact, no
case has been found in which the effect of such presumption in
favor of these laws has been permitted to be overcome. Thus a
Minnesota statute barring the teaching of pacifism was upheld,
over the sole dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis ;18' the conviction of
Gitlow for publishing the Left Wing Manifesto 8 7 and that of
Anita Whitney for taking part in the organization of the Com-
munist Labor party' 88 were affirmed. justices Holmes and
Brandeis dissented in the Gitlow Case and concurred specially in
the Whitney Case. They expressed the view that, regardless of
presumptions attaching to legislation, a defendant should always
have the right to show that in his own case there was not in fact
any clear danger that harm to the state would presently result from
his words. Mr. justice Brandeis thus eloquently stated his
opinion:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression, of
free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned
women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bond-
ly) ; Pierce v. United States, (1920) 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 205, 64
L. Ed. 542.185See Patterson v. Colorado, (1907) 205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556,
51 L. Ed. 879; Fox v. Washington, (1915) 236 U. S. 273, 35 Sup. Ct. 383,59 L. Ed. 573. And in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, (1922) 259 U. S.
530, 42 Sup. Ct. 516, 66 L. Ed. 1044, a passing statement denied that the
constitution imposed any restrictions on the states in connection with
freedom of speech.
1SeGilbert v. Minnesota, (1920) 254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125, 65
L. Ed. 287 (Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in result; Chief Justice Whitedissented on the ground that the subject matter had been covered by Act
of Congress). Here Mr. Justice Brandeis criticized the previous tendency
to exalt property over personal rights, saying at 343:
"I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property."
187Gitlow v. New York, (1925) 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed.
1138.
IR1 Whitney v. California, (1927) 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71
L. Ed. 1095.
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age of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented
is a serious one....
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men with
confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied
through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence
of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. ' If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can
justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be
reconciled with freedom."'' 8
In these cases the majority of the Court altogether ignored the
clear and present danger test.
Those anti-criminal syndicalism statutes which prohibited the
advocacy by speech or writing of the overthrow of the govern-
ment by force or violence were the product of the red-baiting
hysteria which followed the Russian Revolution and which was so
sensationally exemplified by the raids of Attorney General
Palmer.190 Some of the laws even prohibited membership in an
organization which advocated any of the forbidden doctrines,
with the result that many persons were convicted, whose sole
offense was membership in the Communist party.191 In the
Whitney Case Mr. Justice Sanford intimated, for the majority,
that membership alone in such an organization might be sufficient
to justify punishment. 92 However, in that case other acts were
proved, so that what decision the Court would have made on this
subject is not certain.
To sustain a conviction, however, it is necessary at least to
prove that the organization to which the accused persons belong
does actually advocate unlawful doctrines. For lack of such
189(1927) 274 U. S. 357, 376, 377, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 71 L Ed. 1095.
19 0See Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time (1920) 229 ff.
191See for instance, People v. Ruthenberg, (1924) 229 Mich. 315, 201
N. W. 358; State v. Boloff, (1931) 138 Or. 568, 4 P. (2d) 326. In the
Ruthenberg Case an appeal taken to the United States Supreme Court was
dismissed because of defendant's death. (1927) 273 U. S. 782, 47 Sup. Ct.
569, 71 L. Ed. 890.
192(1927) 274 U. S. 357, 371, 372, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095.
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proof with regard to the I W. WX., the Court reversed a convic-
tion in Fiske v. Kansas.'93 Nor is punishment permissible if the
acts charged against a defendant are lawful ones; thus a conviction
for displaying a red flag in violation of California's anti-red-flgg
law was set aside because the law forbade such display in "opposi-
tion" to government, and this general language might reach a
manifestation of hostility by perfectly lawful means. 19 4
So in the Herndon Case,'9 ' over the dissent of Justices McRey-
nolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler, the Supreme Court
ruled that the defendant's right of freedom of speech had been
violated, since there was no proof that he had himself advocated
any unlawful doctrine, 9 " and also because, as defined by the
state courts, the statute was too vague to justify the conviction of
any one.1 17  Mr. Justice Roberts quoted with approval the clear
and present danger test, criticized the notion advocated by the
state that speech might be punished because it had a dangerous
trend and made clear that the power of a state to punish speech
may be exercised only under exceptional circumstances.
These cases have involved prosecutions on account of the
supposed harmful character of the speech or literature itself.
Others have arisen in which there was no claim that the contents of
the words used violated any law, and in which the prosecution
113(1927) 274 .U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108. Cf. Burns v.
United States, (1927) 274 U. S. 328, 47 Sup. Ct. 650, 71 L. Ed. 1077
which affirmed a conviction on slightly different evidence. Cf. the recent
decision refusing to permit deportation of a Communist without proof
that the Communist party actually advocated unlawful acts: Strecker v.
Kessler, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 976. See (1938) 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 137, 48 Yale L. J. 111. In dejonge v. Oregon, (1937) 299 U. S. 353, 57
Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278, the sufficiency of the evidence adduced to show
illegal advocacy by the Communist Party was not questioned.
"'
4Stromberg v. California, (1931) 283 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532, 75
L. Ed. 1117. But see People v. Immonen, (1935) 271 Mich. 384, 261 N. W.
59 (statute barring any display of a red flag upheld, but convictions re-
versed for errors at trial).
"15Herndon v. Lowry, (1937) 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed.
1066. See the earlier decision, Herndon v. Georgia, (1935) 295 U. S.
441, 55 Sup. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1530 refusing jurisdiction on technical
grounds, over the dissent of Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo.
0O8He was charged with inciting to insurrection through solicitation of
members in the Communist Party and distribution of booklets. Proof of
the aims of the party was confined to these booklets, one of which advo-
cated the establishment of a black belt where negroes were to have the
right of self-determination. This, said the state court and the minority,
necessarily involved the use of force. The majority ruled otherwise, since
there was no proof that Herndon had advocated the establishment of such
a belt, or that any of the persons he had solicited as members knew that the
establishment of such a belt was being urged.
107Sce cases cited in note 150 supra.
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rested on the circumstances of the delivery or distribution of the
words. Municipalities have endeavored to restrict street meetings
and pamphlet distribution by requiring permits, and have even
tried to justify the total prohibition of such activities on the
ground that meetings interfere with traffic and distribution of
leaflets litters the streets. Until recently there have been no
authoritative rulings on these two subjects.
In 1897 the Supreme Court, in Davis v. Massachusetts,"s
upheld a conviction for speaking on the Boston Common without
a permit. This case, which has often been considered an authority
in support of municipal restrictions on street meetings, was de-
cided without any reference to rights of free speech. Plaintiff
had proceeded on the theory that, as a citizen, he had certain
property rights in the Common which the city could not deny him;
the Court rejected this view, and held that since the city, as
owner, might altogether have forbidden the holding of meetings
on the Common it could require a permit.
It has been supposed that the recent decision in Lovell v.
Griffin'99 points the other way. There a conviction for distribut-
ing a pamphlet on private property without the permit required
by an ordinance was reversed on the ground that freedom of the
press forbids any such restriction on the distribution of unobjec-
tionable matter. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character
is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the
press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for
the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power
of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton
directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed
Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially a right to
publish 'without a license what formerly could be published only
with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon pub-
lication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty,
the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adop-
tion of the constitutional provision. Legislation of the type of
the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and
censorship in its baldest form.
"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These
198(1897) 167 .U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. Ed. 71. To like effect
are People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, (1921) 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364;
People v. Smith, (1934) 263 N. Y. 255, 188 N. E. 745.
199(1938) 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949. See application
of the rule of this case in People v. Banks, (1938) 168 Misc. Rep. 515, 6
N. Y. S. (2d) 41 and C. I. 0. v. Hague, (D. NJ. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 127,
(C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1939) 101 Fed. (2d) 774.
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indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as
the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history
abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation compre-
hends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of infor-
mation and opinion.-' o00
It must be borne in mind, however, that in the Lovell Case
the Court was not concerned with distribution on the public
streets and that the Court expressly intimated that distribution
might be punished if it was done in an offensive manner or littered
the streets or obstructed traffic. And ordinances which punish
the distribution of leaflets in order to prevent street littering have
been generally upheld by the courts.
201
The better view, however, should be that neither leaflet distri-
bution nor street meetings may be prohibited because of the fear
of resultant littering or obstruction of traffic. That does not
mean that a municipality may not punish a person who actually
litters the streets or obstructs the traffic. The same considera-
tion should apply to the doctrine recently invoked by Mayor
Hague, that fear of disorder because of the upopular views of the
speaker justifies barring a meeting.20 2  Persons guilty of disorder
should be punished; the speaker should be unmolested unless he
has, by incitement, caused the disorder. In all these situations
the public interest is better served by increased appropriations
for street cleaners and policemen than by the suppression of
leaflet distribution or street meetings.
200 (1938) 303 U. S. 444, 451, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949.
2OlCity of Milwaukee v. Snyder, (Wis. 1938) 283 N. W. 301 certiorari
granted April 17, 1939; People v. Young, (1938) 3 Cal. App. Supp. 62, 85 P.
(2d) 231, now on appeal to the United States Supreme Court; Common-
wealth v. Nichols, (Mass. 1938) 18 N. E. (2d) 166, now on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. The Lovell Case was distinguished on the
ground that the ordinance there considered forbade distribution on private
property as well as on the streets.
Earlier decisions upholding convictions on the theory that street lit-
tering may be prevented are: People v. White, (1935) Cal. Cr. A. 1255;
Sieroty v. City of Huntington Park, (1931) 111 Cal. App. 377 (dealt
with advertising matter).
On the other hand convictions have been set aside on the ground that
such ordinances should not be construed as applicable to non-commercial
matter: Coughlin v. Sullivan, (1924) 100 N. J. L. 42, 126 AtI. 177, Peo-
ple v. Johnson, (1921) 117 Misc. Rep. 133, 191 N. Y. S. 750, or on the
ground that the ordinances violated freedom of speech: City of Chicago v.
Schultz, (1930) 341 I1. 208, 173 N. E. 276; People v. Armstrong, (1899)
73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275; New Rochelle v. McCormick, June 11, 1935,
Westch. L. 3. 997; Ex parte Pierce, (1934) 127 Tex. Cr. 35, 75 S. W. 2nd
264. The first two of this last group of cases emphasize the fact that the
ordinances were too broad in that proof of littering was not necessary.
See also People v. Armentrout, (1931) 118 Cal. App. 761, 1 P. (2d)
556. See (1937) 5 Bulletin I. J. A. 147.
202C.I.O. v. Hague, (D. N.J. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 127, affirmed (C.C.A.
3d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 714.
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In C.I.O. v. Hague,2 3 Judge Clark in part accepted the views
just outlined. He warned against the use of street littering
ordinances for the purpose "of protecting the minds of the people
who walk those streets against being littered with certain kinds
of ideas and again traditionally perhaps, being frightened." He
recognized that. the Davis Case was not controlling on the subject
of meetings and ruled that although the city had the right to bar
street meetings, it had no right to bar meetings in the public parks.
He reached this latter conclusion because the recreation purposes
of the parks included "an easement of assemblage."
However, Judge Clark suggested a method whereby the
Jersey City authorities might in fact exercise a considerable
degree of censorship. He said that where the evidence indicated
that a person desiring a permit had spoken "in such fashion that
audiences similar to those to be reasonably expected in Jersey
City have indulged in breaches of the peace," then a copy of the
speech could be required in advance and censored, or else the
speaker could be bound over to keep the peace. This very objec-
tionable suggestion was, however, purely dictum, since the Court
expressly stated that the record indicated no basis for the exercise
of such censorship as to any of the persons involved in the law
suit. Accordingly, the decree left out all references to censorship.
It also modified the opinion on the subject of street meetings by
ruling that so long as the city permitted any street meetings to
be held it must allow the plaintiffs also to hold such meetings.
On appeal to the circuit court of appeals, this decision was
strengthened. The majority of the Court held the ordinance
barring street meetings unconstitutional because it constituted
censorship, and also because it had been administered in a dis-
criminatory manner. The portion of the decree which permitted
plaintiffs to hold street meetings only so long as others were
allowed to do so was stricken out as unnecessary, in view of the
ruling that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Of the conduct
of the authorities Judge Biggs said:
"The interpretation of the rights of free speech and free
assembly contended for by the appellants is shocking and places
these rights in the hands of those who would destroy them.
"If the ill-intentioned threatened riot, speech may not be had.
Under what conditions, then, would not the cry of riot be raised?
Applying the appellants' doctrine literally, political speakers
203(D. N.J. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 127. affirmed (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1939) 101
F. (2d) 774, with a modification-now awaiting decision from the United
States Supreme Court.
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might not stump a city in any election if their opponents objected
to what they had to say and threatened disorder. The strict
application of such a rule would result eventually in the existence
of but one political party as is now the case under totalitarian
governments."
This decision is a notable advance in the history of civil
liberties. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will affirm it
in all respects.
Questions more directly related to newspapers deal with con-
tempt, the use of the mails, censorship and taxation. Freedom of
the press has been restricted by the power of the courts to punish
as a contempt the publication of comment about judicial proceed-
ings when the comment is calculated to impede the administra-
tion of justice..2 114  Until now the United States Supreme Court
has refused to hold a conviction for contempt to be a denial of
freedom of the press, whether as guaranteed by the first amend-
ment '-'0 or by the due process clause of the fourteenth.2 0 6
There has, however, been no thorough discussion of the
subject. The Supreme Court has contented itself with the routine
statement that freedom of the press does not mean the freedom to
do wrong. The subject has assumed new importance because of
a number of recent instances of punishment for newspaper utter-
ancesY'7  If, as seems probable, some such case will soon reach
21'4See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication, (1928) 28 Col. L.
Rev. 525; Contempt of Court for Publications, (1936) 5 I. J. A. Bulletin
63. 205Toledo Newspaper Company v. United States, (1918) 247 U. S.
402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186. The articles objected to were, it
was found, calculated to inspire resistance to an injunction. Justices Holmes
and Brandeis dissented. They did not discuss the constitutional issue, but
merely the power of the Court under the Congressional statute. Holmes
expressed the opinion that a judge was "expected to be a man of ordinary
firmness of character," and that the judge in the case should not have been
influenced by the articles complained of.2 06Patterson v. Colorado, (1907) 205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556, 51 L.
Ed. 879. This case was decided before the Court bad extended the mean-
ing of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to include
freedom of speech. (See note 185, supra.) Mr. Justice Holmes for the
majority, in dismissing the writ of error, indicated that in any event the
constitutional provision did not prevent punishment of publications after
they were made. He rejected the contention that the proceedings were in-
valid because the judges sat in their own cases. Justices Harlan and
Brewer dissented on the ground that substantial constitutional issues were
raised; the former also reached the conclusion that the action of the
court below was a violation of freedom of the press.
207See The Times Mirror Company v. The Superior Court now on
appeal to the California Supreme Court; (for opinion of the lower court
on demurrer see the Los Angeles News, August 1938 Supplement page~l) :
Woodbury v. Commonwealth, (Mass. 1936) 3 N. E. (2d) 779. See con-
tra, State v. American News Company, (1936) 64 So. Dak. 385, 266 N. W.
827. See (1938) 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 120; (1938) 48 Yale L. J. 54.
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the United States Supreme Court, it is to be hoped that it will
deal with the problem in a more comprehensive answer.
The social importance of a full discussion of public affairs,
including criticism of the courts, is too great to permit the judges,
who themselves are criticized, to sit in judgment on their critics.
Surely it is possible to vindicate the dignity of the courts without
the use of this summary process. The constitutional guaranties
should require, at least, that persons who are charged with the
publication of improper statements about judges be tried in the
ordinary manner. And comment which is fair should not be
punishable at all merely because the legal proceedings discussed
are still pending.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the power of
Congress to exclude from the mails matter deemed harmful be-
cause of fraud, immorality or seditious character.208 This broad
power is sustained on the theory that the use of the mails is a
privilege which can be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the
legislature. It is a view which ignores the importance of the
mail service, especially (on account of the second class mailing
privilege) its importance in regard to periodicals. It is to be
hoped that the Court will set itself against any attempt to use
this power in order to censor opinion.
At least in Near v. Mihnesota0 9 over the dissent of the four
conservative justices, the Court denied to a state the power to
enjoin the further publication of a newspaper charged with being
a public nuisance on account of its persistent publication of
scandalous matter. But Chief Justice Hughes intimated that a
different result would have been reached, had the charge been
the publication of obscene matter. Thus the door was opened to
censorship of this sort of material. 210
The only other censorship cases which have reached the
Supreme Court involved motion pictures. The Court treated
these as spectacles, not organs of opinion, and therefore upheld
state censorship laws ;211 and the view has been extended to include
2O8In re Rapier, (1892) 143 U. S. 110, 12 Sup. Ct. 374, 36 L. Ed. 93;
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1904) 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789, 48
L. Ed. 1092. See Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, (1938)
36 Mich. L. Rev. 703.
209(1931) 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357.
210See Alpert, Censorship of Obscene Literature, (1938) 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 40.2
"Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Ind. Comm., (1915) 236 U. S. 230, 35
Sup. Ct. 387, 59 L. Ed. 552; Mutual Film Corp. v. Kansas, (1915) 236
U. S. 248, 35 Sup. Ct. 393, 59 L. Ed. 561. The Court considered only state
constitutional provisions since the modern view of the due process clause
had not yet been accepted.
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newsreels as well as motion picture plays.2 12 These decisions are
not consistent with a broad view of freedom of expression. That
should be maintained regardless of the medium employed. Fear
of punishment after the event would, in most instances, be suffi-
cient to deter violators of the law; and the judgment of a jury
on what is objectionable should be preferred to that of bureau-
crats. In no other way can the inevitable bigotry of censorships
be guarded against.
Two other newspaper cases require brief comment. In
Grosjean v. American Press Co.,213 the Supreme Court unani-
mously held void a Louisiana tax on advertising, on the ground
that it was designed to restrict the circulation of large newspapers
rather than to produce revenue. In the Associated Press Case,"'
the Court ruled that freedom of the press had not been infringed
by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act which pro-
hibits the dismissal of employees for their organizational activi-
ties. The case is remarkable because, for the first time in this
whole series of cases, the four conservative Justices saw an issue
of free speech involved where their liberal brethren could not per-
ceive one. The dissenters argued that it was a denial of free
speech to require a newspaper to retain an employee active in
union affairs, because, as an editorial writer, his union attitude
might conflict with the newspaper's policy. The answer of the
majority was that nothing in the Act prevented the discharge of
an employee whose bias prevented him from carrying out instruc-
tions.
Other issues of freedom of speech and of the press have been
raised in a number of cases decided by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. To what extent is it an interference with constitu-
tional rights for the Board to order an employer to stop circulat-
ing among his employees material hostile to labor unions? The
question has been much debated in the press. 21 - To the writer
it seems clear that no constitutional issue is involved when an
employer uses speech or writing to intimidate or coerce his em-
ployees. Thus far, at least, the Labor Board has not ruled against
212Pathe Exchange Inc. v. Cobb, (1922) 202 App. Div. 450, aff'd 236
N. Y. 539, 142 N. E. 274.
213(1936) 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L. Ed. 660.
214(1937) 301 U. S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650, 81 L. Ed. 953.
2 5 See New York Times (1938) July 8, 16:1; July 12, 18:3, 5; July 13,
7:4; July 14, 20:6; July 23, 5:5; July 25, 1:5, (1938) 145 New Republic
278, 347; (1938) 48 Yale L. J. 72; 7 I. J. A. Bull. 25. See also N. L. R. B.
v. Union Pacific Stages, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 99 Fed. 153 at 178.
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employers except in cases in which the latter not only distributed
offensive material, but also committed unlawful acts, as in the
Ford Case,216 where many acts of terrorism and intimidation were
established. In such instances as this an application of the "clear
and present danger" rule appears to justify the orders of the Board.
This rule should be applicable to this situation just as it is to cases
arising under the various criminal syndicalism statutes.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
Correlative with the right to hold an opinion, to express it
and to publish it, must be the right to associate freely with others
who share it. This right of assembly was long ago recognized
as inherent in free institutions.2 1 T And recently the Supreme
Court placed the right of assembly among those fundamental rights
embraced within the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
In de Jonge v. Oregon,2' 8 the Court unanimously reversed a
conviction for criminal syndicalism -which rested solely on the
fact that the defendant assisted at a meeting held under the auspices
of the Communist Party. The Chief Justice said:
"These rights may be abused by using speech or press or
assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The people
through their legislatures may protect themselves against that
abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional
justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves
must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of safe-
guarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our
institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need
to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free
press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be re-
sponsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired,
may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of
the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional govern-
ment."
219
The ruling in this case is important rather for its implications
than for the actual decision. That was on very narrow grounds;
and at any rate, it is not likely similar prosecutions would often be
attempted. The decision has nevertheless been useful because
216(1937) 4 N.L.R.B. No. 81-The Board has withdrawn this order-See
Ford Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 301-a new order is pend-
ing. 217United States v. Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.
218(1937) 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278.
219(1937) -299 U. S. 353, 364, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278.
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of its emphasis on the right to meet freely without police inter-
ference, so long as the persons meeting do nothing unlawful. Just
as the Griffin Case helped people circulate expressions of their
viewpoint, so has the de Jonge Case helped groups freely to hold
meetings in private halls. Should the Court decide that street
meetings come also under constitutional protection, as it may
have done in the Hague Case by the time this paper appears, a
great step will have been taken toward making the guaranties of
freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly truly effective.
Yet, here, as in other fields, reasonable regulation of assem-
blies will be upheld. The Court so ruled in New York's Ku
Klux Klan case, some years ago.-- There the law challenged
required all associations which imposed oaths on their members to
register a membership list with the Secretary of State and made
it a crime to belong to an association, or attend one of its meet-
ings, knowing that no such list had been filed. The Court when
it sustained this as a reasonable police measure, did not, neverthe-
less, discuss any rights of the defendants to assemble freely. A
new test of this law was avoided, by reversal on the facts of a
conviction of the Nazi Bund.
2 2
1
EDUCATION
Analogous to the rights of opinion expressly specified in the
first amendment is the right to determine the education of one's
children, a right nowhere mentioned in the constitution, but read
into the due process clause by the Supreme Court. The issue
arose when the antagonism of the World War produced a variety
of laws prohibiting the teaching of German to young school chil-
dren, and, as part of the so-called Americanism of the post war
period, of other foreign languages as well. The Court held all
these laws unconstitutional, over the dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes.222 In line with his general philosophy that where reason-
able men might differ about the desirability of a law the deci-
sion of a legislature should not be disturbed, Justice Holmes
could see that reasons might be advanced why young children
should receive their school instruction in English.
--2New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, (1928) 278 U. S. 63, 49
Sup. Ct. 61, 73 L. Ed. 184.
-°-°1People v. Mueller, (1938) 255 App. Div. 316, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 522.
--
2Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923) 262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed.
1042; Bartels v. Iowa, (1923) 262 U. S. 404, 43 Sup. Ct. 628, 67 L. Ed.
1047. Cf. Farrington v. Tokuskige, (1927) 273 U. S. 284, 47 Sup. Ct. 406,
71 L. Ed. 646 applying the same principle to laws of a territory which placed
under public control all "foreign language" schools.
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Mr. Justice Holmes joined the rest of the Court, however, in
condemning an attempt made in certain states to outlaw private
schools altogether, agreeing that the state had no power to
"standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only." 223  Mr. Justice McReynolds said
the state had wide powers of regulation over schools and could
require teachers to be of "patriotic disposition." And, in the
various Jehovah's Witnesses flag-salute cases, attacks upon school
regulations on the ground that they interfered with parents' rights
to control the education of their children failed as they did on the
religious ground already discussed.
We have ignored certain of the amendments as lacking in
either importance or controversial character. Thus the second
guarantees the right to bear arms-but not the right to maintain
private armies ;224 the third protects against the quartering of
soldiers; the seventh requires jury trial in civil actions other than
the most trivial; the eighth prohibits excessive bail and cruel and
unusual punishments. But in the enumeration of the rights fixed
by the constitution either by express statement or judicial inter-
pretation, one category is conspicuous by its absence: the rights of
labor. That omission is not, of course, strange, since it is only
in very recent times that labor has grown sufficiently powerful
in the economic scene to command a place in the constitutional
scheme. Despite this absence of constitutional sanctions, it is
impossible, however, to close a discussion of the Bill of Rights
without some consideration of labor's claims, if only as an index
of changes to come in the near future. As we have seen, a cumu-
lative number of the cases which have arisen under the topics
already discussed had their origin in labor controversies.
VII. IN AID OF LABOR?
It is obvious that the preservation of civil liberties in the
accustomed fields is essential to the freedom and functioning of
labor organizations, perhaps even to a greater extent than to any
other group in the community. And labor itself has been quick
to recognize this fact.
But it is not enough that labor be free to exercise the rights
granted to all. There are certain specific rights which it believes
223Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, (1925) 268 U. S. 510,
45 Sup. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070.
224See Presser v. Illinois, (1886) 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580, 29
L. Ed. 615.
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itself to be entitled to under modern conditions of industry, and
would like to see protected by constitutional enactments. These
are: the right to bargain collectively; the outlawing of yellow dog
contracts; the right to demand a closed shop; and, of course, the
right to strike, with its concomitant weapons, picketing and the
boycott, free from harassing injunctions. With much variation
among the states, these rights have all received some legislative
or judicial sanction. But, except for a few provisions outlawing
blacklists,:"' state constitutions are silent on the topics. In the
recent New York Convention proposals embodying most of the
subjects were defeated, only the one guaranteeing the right of
collective bargaining having been approved.
2 2 6
It is impossible to review here the great mass of decisions on
labor subjects. Nor is it necessary. The task has recently re-
ceived a great deal of attention.2 2 7  We shall confine ourselves in
the main to outlines and to the leading cases in the United States
Supreme Court.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
While without constitutional sanction, this right has at least
been given judicial recognition sufficient to validate legislation
which seeks to preserve it. The Supreme Court has upheld both
the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act,
which guarantee collective bargaining in interstate com-
merce. 22  Thus employers may be forbidden to interfere with their
225Ariz. XVIII sec. 9; N. D. XVII sec. 212; Utah XVI sec. 4. Several
states, however, imposed an eight hour day on public works. Ariz. XVIII
sec 1; Id. XIII sec. 2; N. M. XX sec. 19; Ohio II sec. 37; Okla. XXIII
sec. 1; Utah XVI sec. 6; Wyo. XIX sec. 2.2 2OSee N. Y. Times (1938) Aug. 12 at 1:3. N. Y. Const. (1939) Art.
I sec. 17.
22 7See Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yel-
low Dog Contracts, (1936) 30 I1. L. Rev. 854; Frankfurter and Greene,
The Labor Injunction (1930); Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the
Courts, (1932) 10 N. C. L. Rev. 158, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Dis-
putes, (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 341; Larson, The Labor Relations Acts-Their
Effect on Industrial Warfare (1938) 36 Mich. L. R. 1237, 1272; Lien, Labor
Law and Relations (1938) ; Magruder, Development of Collective Bargain-
ing, (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1071. Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitude
toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislation (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAw
REVIEw 255; articles in (1938) 5 Law and Contemporary Problems 175 ff.
See also Bulletin published monthly since May 1932 by the International
Juridical Ass'n; Note, (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1295; Note, (1938) 51
Harv. L. Rev. 520.
2 2 8Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, (1930)
281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034; Virginian R. Co. v. System
Federation No. 40, (1937) 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789;
Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. N. L. R. B. (1937) 301
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employees' free choice of representatives; they may be required
to deal with the representatives of a majority only; they may be
compelled to reinstate employees discharged on account of their
organizational activities. As Chief Justice Hughes has said:
"The legality of collective action on the part of employees in
order to safeguard their proper interests is not to be disputed.
It has long been recognized that employees are entitled to organize
for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and to pro-
mote agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and
conditions of work. Congress was not required to ignore this
right of the employees but could safeguard it and seek to make
their appropriate collective action an instrument of peace rather
than of strife. Such collective action would be a mockery if
representation were made futile by interference with freedom of
choice. Thus the prohibition by Congress of interference with
selection of representatives for the purpose of negotiation and con-
ference between employers and employees, instead of being an in-
vasion of the constitutional right of either, was based on the
recognition of the rights of both."
22
1
Yet Congress can at any time repeal these laws. It is even
conceivable that that body (or a state legislature) could constitu-
tionally enact laws of a nature exactly opposite to the existing ones,
laws which would deny the right to organize. Hence the demand
for constitutional protection of this right.
YELLOW DOG CONTRACTS
As we have seen, 2 ° early attempts to outlaw yellow dog con-
tracts failed through judicial veto, on the theory that the right to
hire and fire is essential to an employer's freedom to conduct his
business. Even in the collective bargaining cases just discussed,
the Supreme Court distinguished, but did not overrule, these early
decisions. Yet it is to be hoped that, as now constituted, the Court
will reach a different conclusion when the issue is again presented
under the Norris-La Guardia Act or some of the recent state laws.
There is basis for the expectation in the fact that the new laws
differ from those previously condemned. They impose no criminal
U. S. 142, 57 Sup. Ct. 648, 81 L. Ed. 965; N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin,
Inc., (1937) 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893. The Court had,
indeed, indicated its understanding of the necessity of organization even be-
fore these laws had been enacted. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-
City Central Trades Council, (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed.
189. 229Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, (1930)
281 U. S. 548, 571, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034.
23oSee note 160 supra. See also People v. Marcus, (1906) 185 N. Y.
257, 77 N. E. 1073 and other cases cited by Frankfurter and Greene at
146 n. 54.
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penalties, but simply deprive the courts of jurisdiction to enforce
yellow dog contracts, sometimes, however, also declaring these
to be against public policy. It is difficult to see how a Court which
has upheld legislation to protect collective bargaining can void laws
designed to implement this legislation by striking down a device
whose sole purpose is to prevent collective bargaining. That, in
recent times, no employer has sought to enforce yellow dog con-
tracts by injunction, 31 may be taken as recognition of the validity
of these new laws.
THE CLOSED SHOP
On this subject the Supreme Court has been silent. And recent
cases in other jurisdictions are in great conflict. In New York the
closed shop is legal, except under special conditions ;232 in New
Jersey it is subject to many restrictions ;233 in some states it is
illegal altogether..2 34 The subject is inherently difficult, due to the
conflict of rights involved. On the one hand it is said that no one
should be forced to join a union as a condition of being able to
earn his living; on the other, that it is unfair for a worker to
benefit by a union's efforts without sharing in the necessary
sacrifice and responsibility. In some cases a closed shop may be
essential to the continued existence of the union; in others a
preferential shop may be a satisfactory solution.2 35  Clear it is that
if closed shop agreements are to be recognized, the union must
admit all qualified persons to membership.23 6 This is a subject
which will necessitate much study before it can receive constitu-
tional formulation.
23'As in Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38
Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260.
232Nat. Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, (1902) 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E.
369; Williams v. Quill, (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. 2d 547. But see
Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, (1919) 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97. See
also (1938) 6 I. J. A. Bull. 147; Abelow, The Closed Shop in New York,
(1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 459.3 Lebigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic S. W., (V. Ch. 1921) 92
N. J. Eq. 131, 111 AtI. 376; Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliveries Union,
(V. Ch. 1938) 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720.234See Erdman v. Mitchell, (1903) 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 AtI. 327. Keith
Theatre, Inc. v. Vachon (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; Simon v.
Sehwachman, (1938) 18 N. E. 2d (Mass.).
235See the arguments of Brandeis before he became a judge before the
United States Commission on Industrial Relations (1915) Senate Doc.,
64th Congress, 1st Sess. Vol. 26 (Serial Vol. 6936) 7679-81, reprinted,
Fraenkel, ed., The Curse of Bigness (1934) 93-95.
23
",See Bigelow, V. Ch. in the Wilson Case, note 233 supra.
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THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, PICKET AND BOYCOTT
The right to strike is, of course, generally recognized-at least
in theory. It is expressly preserved by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, but, because of the peculiar nature of the business there
affected, it is somewhat restricted by the National Railway Labor
Act.237  Yet the courts will sometimes enjoin strikes if they be-
lieve them called for illegal purposes. And, even when the strike
itself may not be enjoined, its efficacy is often curtailed by burden-
some restrictions upon picketing and other activities.
Compulsory arbitration, with its drastic interference with the
right to strike, has been tried but once in this country, in Kansas.
At the instance of manufacturers, the Supreme Court held this law
unconstitutional in so far as it attempted to regulate wages and
hours in industries not affected with a public interest.2 38  Yet the
law survived as a weapon against strikers. In the first case which
reached the Supreme Court, Howat v. Kansas, 239 the Court did
not pass on any constitutional issue, but dismissed the appeal on
the ground that the injunction rested on general equitable prin-
ciples, not necessarily upon the challenged law. In the second case,
Dorchy v. Kansas,240 the law was upheld in so far as it justified
enjoining a strike called for an illegal purpose (in that instance,
the enforcing of the wage claim of a single employee). This, the
Court concluded, amounted to an attempt at coercion.
In the recent case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union24 1
the Court, over the dissent of the four conservative justices, held
valid a strike called to enforce a union rule which forbade an
employer from himself working at his trade. The right to strike
thus depends upon what a majority of the Court may think about
the propriety of the ends for which the strike is called. With the
breaking up of the former conservative bloc by the retirements of
Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland, we may look forward to
decisions more consistently favorable to labor than has been the
case in the past.
237(1935) 45 .U. S. C. 155, 156, 160.
238Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Ind. Rel., (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43
Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103; (1925) 267 U. S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct. 441, 69 L.
Ed. 785.
239(1922) 258 U. S. 181, 42 Sup. Ct. 277, 66 L. Ed. 550, but recent de-
cisions seem to indicate that the Court will take jurisdiction if the lower
court relied on a statute to any extent: Senn v. Tile Layers Protective
Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.
240(1926) 272 U. S. 306, 47 Sup. Ct. 86, 71 L. Ed. 248. See also earlier
decision in same case, (1924) 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct. 323, 68 L. Ed.
686.
241(1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.
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The right to picket and boycott will generally depend upon the
right to strike. And there are also problems of the means em-
ployed. Thus group picketing was at one time declared unlawful,
as bound to have an intimidatory effect.2 42 And secondary boy-
cotts have been enjoined as violations of the anti-trust laws, even
though no unfair means were adopted. 243  The Supreme Court
also (although this was many years ago) approved an injunction
issued to prevent the breach of yellow dog contracts, despite the
fact that the employer might have terminated these contracts at
will.244 This decision has not been universally followed.
245
In the Senn case, on the other hand, Mr. Justice Brandeis said
that the right to picket was based on the right of free speech.
2 46
Thus, perhaps, he laid the foundation for some future decision
protecting that right against abridgement by judicial or legislative
action.2 47
INJUNCTIONS
One of labor's chief complaints has been the abuse of injunc-
tions. To redress these grievances, statutes were passed several
decades ago. But in 1921 the Supreme Court in Truax v. Cor-
rigan2 48 held these void over the dissent of Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, Clarke and Pitney. The majority ruled that such laws
violated due process in legalizing inherently unlawful practices and
denied equal protection because the restriction on the issuance
of injunction was confined to labor cases. Chief Justice Taft
could see no basis for special classification of these.
The Sem Case lessened the evil effect of that decision.
249
In this instance the four conservative judges constituted the minor-
24 2See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,
(1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189.243Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n. (1927)
274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916, justices Holmes, Brandeis
dissenting.
2 4Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct.
65, 62 L. Ed. 260. Justices Holmes, Clarke, Brandeis dissenting.24 See Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, (1928) 247 N. Y. 65,
159 N. E. 863; Stilwell Theatre Inc. v. Kaplan, (1932) 259 N. Y. 405, 182
N. E. 63.
240(1937) 301 U. S. 468, 478, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.247Such, in effect, have been the holdings in Shuster v. International
Assn., (1937) 293 Ill. App. 177, 193, 12 N. E. 2d 50 (1931) Kraemer Hosiery
Co. v. American Fed. F. F. H. Workers, 305 Pa. St. 206, 215, 157 Atl. 588.
In re Lyons, (Cal. Superior Ct. 1938) 94 Cal. App. 70, 81 P. (2d) 190;
French Sardine Co. v. Deep Sea & Purse Seine Fisherman's Union, (Cal.
Superior Ct.) Los Angeles News, July 1938 Supp. p. 3; but see contra.
In re Connolly, id. p. 4.
248(1921) 257 ,U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254.
240(1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.
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ity. They believed the Truax Case to be controlling. Unfortu-
nately, the majority did not repudiate entirely the unrealistic basis
of the equal protection part of that decision; Mr. Justice Brandeis
simply said that no constitutional argument could be advanced
against the Wisconsin statute then before the Court, since, unlike
the Arizona law of the earlier case, it legalized no unlawful
acts. Therefore the employer had been denied no protection, since
"one has no constitutional right to a remedy against the lawful
conduct of another. ' 25 0  It is to be hoped the Court will soon ex-
pressly overrule the Truax Case and recognize the validity of the
separate classification of labor cases.
In upholding similar provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
which restrict the manner in which injunctions may be issued in
labor disputes, the Court had no similar difficulty.25 1 That ques-
tion was not, of course, complicated by any issue of equal pro-
tection, since Congress is restricted by no such clause . 2  And
the Court has given a broad interpretation of the definition of
labor disputes in that law, overruling a tendency of some lower
courts to emasculate it.25 In Lauf v. Shinner,2 14 Mr. Justice
Butler dissenting, the Court in effect held that the law was ap-
plicable though none of a particular employer's employees belonged
to the labor union involved in the strike. And in New Negro
Alliance vu. Sanitary Grocery Co.,2 5 the Court ruled that a con-
250(1937) 301 U. S. 468, 478, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.
251Lauf v. Shinner, (1937) 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed.
867. 252See note 10, supra.253See I. J. A. Bulletin and cases cited in notes 254, 255 infra. See
also I. L. -G. W. U. v. Donnelly Garment Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 243, 58
Sup. Ct. 875, 82 L. Ed. 1316 where the Court, although not passing on the
merits, reversed on technical grounds an order which, on the ground that
the acts complained of were unlawful, held (W.D. Mo. 1938) (21 F. Supp.
807) that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply. See (W.D. Mo. 1938)
23 F. Supp. 998 and (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 309 proceedings holding
the law applicable.254Lauf v. Shinner, (1937) 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed. 867.
Whether this ruling will apply where the real dispute is between rival
unions is uncertain. See, holding that such dispute is not a "labor dispute":
United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 80 F. 2d 1,
cert. den. (1936) 297 .U. S. 714, 56 Sup. Ct. 590, 80 L. Ed. 1000; Newton v.
Laclede Steel Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 80 F. 2d 636; Union Premier
Food Stores, Inc. v. Retail Food Clerks and Managers Union, (C.C.A.
3rd Cir. 1938) 98 F. 2d 821. See contra: Blankenship v. Kurfman, (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1936) 96 F. (2d) 450; Houston & North Texas Lines v. Local
Union No. 886. (W.D. Okla. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 619; Mason Manufacturing
Co. v. United Furniture Workers, Los Angeles News, July 1938 Supp. p.
3 (Cal. Superior Ct.) Fur Workers Union v. Fur Workers Union, (1939
C.A. D.C.).255(1938) 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012.
BILL OF RIGHTS
troversy was none the less a labor dispute because it grew out of
racial or religious discrimination in the selection of employees.
justices McReynolds and Butler dissented because they were un-
able to conceive how Congress could constitutionally authorize
"mobbish" interference with an employer's rights, forgetting that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act legalizes no conduct, but merely pre-
vents the reckless granting of injunctions which was common be-
fore its passage.
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These recent decisions of the Supreme Court show a greater
understanding than earlier of the realities in the field of labor con-
troversies. But although restrictions on the issuance of injunc-
tions have been thus finally approved, these remain subject wholly
to legislative control. It is not strange, therefore, that labor
should desire some constitutional protection for the right to strike,
picket and boycott, free from the hampering effects of injunc-
tions.
VIII. SOME PROPOSALS
Let us suppose we were charged with the task of rewriting
the civil liberties provisions of the constitution. What would be
the changes we should propose? First, we should bring all the
rights together into one article. Then we should make every pro-
vision expressly binding as well on the states as on the federal
government. So far, probably, we should arouse no great contro-
versy, although we should somewhat have extended the area of
federal concern.
Among the more debatable possible changes are these: should
the power of the federal government extend to interference with
civil liberties by private persons? Should the due process clause
be rewritten to restrict it to its original, procedural, meaning?
Should specific labor clauses be added to the constitution?
RESTRAINTS ON PRIVATE ACTION
So long as the Supreme Court adheres to the principle that
Congress can prohibit only state and not individual action, 257 the
effective protection of civil liberties rests with the states. Our
history has shown that the states cannot always be relied on to
play their part. The greatest infringements of personal rights
25BSee authorities cited in note 227 supra.257Notes 68, 69, 75, supra.
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come not from direct state action, but from private forces which
the state is unwilling to check. The recent disclosures before the
LaFollette Committee2,8 make this abundantly clear. No effective
restriction is possible on the fascism today rampant in sections of
Alabama, California and Kentucky, to mention only the most con-
spicuous instances, without federal intervention. It is important,
therefore, that Congress be given power to punish interference
with personal rights by private agencies, as well as by state
action.
DUE PROCESS
In spite of the more humane attitude the Court has taken in
recent decisions, the due process clause remains a potential ob-
stacle to all progressive legislation. Many believe the only course
is to deprive the courts of power to declare laws unconstitutional. 219
Others are of the opinion that affirmative grants of power to Con-
gress and state legislatures would accomplish the end. Advocates
of the latter course recognize, however, the danger that particular
legislation may not be covered by such grants, no matter how
broadly framed. The Court has done strange things when con-
struing some of the existing amendments.260 One possible al-
ternative would be a redefinition of the due process clause such
that the power of courts to review legislation would be greatly
restricted, while preserving judicial review of executive, admin-
istrative or judicial acts to the extent that these fail in giving an
interested party a proper hearing.2 61
Such reformulation would require also an express statement
of certain rights now embraced by the due process clause, such
as the right to determine the education of one's children which we
have already considered.2 62 It might be desirable to provide ex-
plicitly against vague and indefinite criminal laws. And other
25sHearings of Sub-committee of Committee on Education and Labor
of United States Senate, under Resolution 266 of the 74th Congress, Sec-
ond Session, continued in 75th Congress and Report No. 46, 75th Congress,
in various parts (1937, 1938).
259See note 167 supra.
260For the Court has emasculated the very broad powers granted by
the sixteenth amendment. See: Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189,
40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521; Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co.,(1934) 292 U. S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 758, 78 L. Ed. 1311.
2'1"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property by the
action of any judicial or executive tribunal or officer, except after due notice
and a fair and impartial hearing."282See notes 222, 223 supra.
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problems may present themselves on fuller consideration of this
troublesome question. Yet it seems to the writer that this sug-
gested restoration of due process to its original connotation af-
fords an excellent method of taking the sting out of the doctrine
of judicial review.
LABOR CASES
The need for some constitutional formulation of labor's rights
has already been indicated. It may, at this point, perhaps, be ap-
propriate to point to some general facts which support the demand.
Labor has 'suffered greatly from the courts, particularly from
judges of first instance. Recent experience in New York 263 has
indicated that liberal decisions by high courts are no guaranty of
similar decisions at special term. In most cases it is useless to
appeal, due to the expense and delay involved. There is some be-
lief, however, that judges who now ignore the rulings of appellate
courts and pervert the meaning of statutes might hesitate similarly
to treat guarantees explicitly written into the constituion. The
experiment is worth trying.
MISCELLANEOUS
Other possible changes relate to habeas corpus, freedom of
expression, discrimination, and voting. It would be desirable
to make the writ of habeas corpus available whenever the civil
courts were functioning, thus preventing the misuse of martial
law in labor disturbances. While many states have constitutional
provisions making the civil authorities supreme over the military,- 4
and some state constitutions assert that the writ of habeas corpus
may never be suspended, 2 5 no connection exists between these
provisions. That relation should be consummated and some pro-
vision inserted in the federal constitution which would permit fed-
eral review of detentions under martial law.
Steps should be taken, further, to extend the guarantees of
free speech and press to all forms of expression of opinion, re-
gardless of the medium of expression employed, thus extend-
ing protection to the stage, the motion picture and the radio.
Two problems arise in connection with discrimination: shall
263See (1936) 5 I. J. A. Bull. 5; People ex rel Sandnes v. Sheriff,
(1937) 164 Misc. Rep. 355, 299 N. Y. S. 9; Stalban v. Friedman, N. Y. Law
Jour., April 3, 1939 p. 1507.264As in Md., Decl. R. 30; see also id. 32; West Va. III S. 12.
2 5As in Md. III S. 55; West Va. III S. 4.
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the grounds be widened, so as to make it clear that segregation is
as discriminatory in law as it really is in fact? And shall the
fifteenth amendment, at least, be broadened so as to make it
impossible for anyone to be denied the right to vote because of
his social, political or religious views?
And perhaps the time has come to provide for the direct elec-
tion of the President and to authorize Congress to fix the quali-
fications for voters for federal officers. As things are today, there
is great variation in the qualifications the states now impose and a
small minority may control the electoral vote of certain states.
By restrictive legislation the class of voters can be progressively
narrowed and the formation of effective opposition parties
altogether prevented. Democracy requires a wide electorate with
opportunity for the registering of minority opinion and there
is no reason why the nation as a whole should suffer from the
backwardness of certain communities. The subject is one which
needs serious consideration, especially because, tied up with the
matter of the suffrage, is that of education and the money to be
spent upon it.
IN CONCLUSION
It may be asked, why write more guarantees into the Con-
stitution? The record of the past 150 years is not such as to
encourage the belief that rights are made secure merely by writ-
ing them down. Even when the highest courts, as has not always
been the case, have respected the guarantees, the powerful inter-
ests which actually control local areas have often ignored their
decisions. The fight for civil liberties must be fought over and
over again. In spite of which fact occasional court victories do
have useful consequences.
What is fixed in the constitution is at least an ideal that shapes
men's conduct. Over a hundred years ago, judge Story recog-
nized this. He said:
"It may be thought, that all paper barriers against the power
of the community are too weak to be worthy of attention: they
are not so strong, as to satisfy all, who have seen and examined
thoroughly the texture of such a defense. Yet, as they have a
tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to estab-
lish the public opinion in their favor, and to rouse the attention
of the whole community, it may be the means to control the major-
ity from those acts, to which they might be otherwise inclined."M"
266Commentaries (ist ed. 1833) Vol. 3. p. 720, paraphrasing Madison, 1
Lloyd's Debates 431.
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In these days when fascist repression has spread into parts of
even our own country, it is of the greatest importance that the
personal rights of individuals be preserved and extended to the
full. For it is these personal rights that are of the essence of
democracy: the form of government defined eloquently by Thomas
Mann as "inspired by the consciousness of the dignity of man." ' 7
"-117The Coming Victory of Democracy (1938) 19.
